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  INTRODUCTION   
In the present financial crisis, the government has become 
extensively involved in managing companies, at times under-
taking massive bailouts. Its involvement has generated signifi-
cant criticism.1 Elizabeth Warren, then-chair of the five-
member Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) created by Con-
gress to oversee implementation of the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008,2 criticized the bailouts as having been 
implemented in a manner that helped the banks but not con-
sumers and the economy as a whole.3 Many of the problems 
pointed out by COP involved loose government oversight of the 
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 1. Scholarly articles critical of government involvement in managing 
business include J.W. Verret’s article on the Treasury Department’s Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP), a major government bailout program. See J.W. 
Verret, Treasury, Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Prac-
tice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 315–25 (2010). The article argues that under any 
of the prevailing theories about the aims of corporate governance—including 
agency, nexus of contracts, shareholder primacy, and director primacy—
corporate governance functions badly when there is a controlling government 
shareholder. Two other commentators, Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock, argue 
that in companies in which the government is the controlling shareholder, the 
rights of minority shareholders cannot be properly protected under current law. 
See generally Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, When the Government Is the Con-
trolling Shareholder: Implications for Delaware, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 409 (2010). 
 2. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 
§ 125, 122 Stat. 3765, 3791. 
 3. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET 
RELIEF PROGRAM: THE SECOND REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 
PANEL 6–11 (2009).  
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banks and other financial institutions that received money 
through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). COP also 
identified conflicts of interest involving dozens of the govern-
ment contractors that were hired by the Treasury Department 
to assist with TARP.4 The Inspector General for TARP has also 
pointed to conflicts of interest in and outside of government as 
a serious problem.5  
The results of government involvement in business are at 
best mixed. By some accounts, the government’s involvement in 
the domestic auto industry has gotten the industry back onto a 
 
 4. As COP pointed out in a recent report:  
[P]rivate companies today perform many of the TARP’s most critical 
functions, operating under 96 different contracts and agreements 
worth a total of $436.7 million. These private businesses do not take 
an oath of office, nor do they stand for election. They may have con-
flicts of interests, are not directly responsible to the public, and are 
not subject to the same disclosure requirements as government actors. 
CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: EXAMINING 
TREASURY’S USE OF FINANCIAL CRISIS CONTRACTING AUTHORITY 1 (2010). In-
deed, this is a general problem when government is involved in managing 
business. Government does not have the expertise or capability to manage 
bailed-out companies or the assets it acquires from those companies, and often 
contracts those jobs out to private entities. These contractors are not bound by 
government ethics rules. See Kathleen Clark, Fiduciary-Based Standards for 
Bailout Contractors: What Treasury Got Right and Wrong in TARP, 95 MINN. 
L. REV. 1612 (2011) (discussing problems with BlackRock, a money manage-
ment firm, and other Treasury Department contractors and various solutions); 
Richard W. Painter, Bailouts: An Essay on Conflicts of Interest and Ethics 
when Government Pays the Tab, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 131, 153 (2009) (high-
lighting this problem in the insider trading context); Eric Lipton & Michael J. 
de la Merced, Wall St. Firm Draws Scrutiny as U.S. Adviser, N.Y. TIMES, May 
19, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 9506375 (discussing how BlackRock 
has won multimillion dollar contracts to help the government manage the res-
cues of Bear Stearns, AIG, and Citigroup). 
 5. See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED 
ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (2009), available 
at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2009/April2009_Quarterly_Report_ 
to_Congress.pdf (“Both from the Hotline and from other leads, SIGTARP has 
initiated, to date, almost 20 preliminary and full criminal investigations. Al-
though the details of those investigations generally will not be discussed un-
less and until public action is taken, the cases vary widely in subject matter 
and include large corporate and securities fraud matters affecting TARP in-
vestments, tax matters, insider trading, public corruption, and mortgage-
modification fraud.”); id. at 7 (“Aspects of [the Public-Private Investment Pro-
gram] make it inherently vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse, including sig-
nificant issues relating to conflicts of interest facing fund managers, collusion 
between participants, and vulnerabilities to money laundering.”). Despite 
these pronouncements of suspected criminal wrongdoing, very few criminal 
cases have been brought in connection with TARP to date, which suggests that 
many of the conflicts of interest involved are either not criminal or are difficult 
to prosecute. 
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profitable footing, at relatively low cost to the taxpayers.6 In-
deed, taxpayers may actually profit.7 Nonetheless, the bailout 
program on the whole still cost taxpayers billions of dollars that 
could have been spent on relieving the economic suffering of 
people rather than companies, and the future of many of the 
bailed-out companies remains uncertain.8 Moreover, the public 
is deeply skeptical of the bailouts; they have been a substantial 
factor in public dissatisfaction with government.9  
However we judge success or failure, government involve-
ment in managing companies is sometimes inevitable. It is 
therefore important to consider how it can be improved. There 
are many reasons why government might perform poorly, but 
one critical reason is conflicts of interest. Conflicts are an issue 
not just when government is “involved” in business, but also 
when it is simply regulating it in the normal course.  
In its capacity as a regulator of business, government aims 
to ensure that businesses are run consistent with what it iden-
tifies as the interests of its citizens—the “public interest.” 
When it manages a business, it still has these same interests to 
consider. But other interests become relevant as well: the in-
terests of the business’s shareholders, employees, and other 
constituencies. Moreover, the “public interest” is scarcely a 
monolith: many legitimate interests exist that government 
could appropriately be advancing. Furthermore, the individuals 
 
 6. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JANUARY OVERSIGHT REPORT: AN 
UPDATE ON TARP SUPPORT FOR THE DOMESTIC AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 1, 95–
98 (2011); see also Bill Vlasic, In G.M.’s Comeback Story, a Pivotal Role Played 
by Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, at B1, available at 2010 WLNR 
21952943. 
 7. Id. But see Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bank-
ruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727, 729 (2010) (observing that the Chrysler bank-
ruptcy did not comply with good bankruptcy practice and was unfair to some 
creditors). Other bailouts that might cost taxpayers less than anticipated in-
clude those of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. See Binyamin Appelbaum, Divi-
dends from Fannie and Freddie Surpass Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2010, at B1, 
available at 2010 WLNR 22206573. But the Fannie and Freddie bailouts will 
still be expensive. See Chris Isidore, Fannie, Freddie Bailout: $153 Billion 
. . . and Counting, CNNMONEY, Mar. 22, 2011, http://money.cnn.com/2011/02/ 
11/news/companies/fannie_freddie_losses/index.htm. 
 8. See, e.g., Michael Rapoport, Bailed-Out Banks Slip Toward Failure, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2010, at C1, available at 2010 WLNR 25509277 (“[T]hird-
quarter results show 98 banks that received more than $4.2 billion in federal 
aid could be in danger of failing.”). 
 9. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: 
ASSESSING THE TARP ON THE EVE OF ITS EXPIRATION 102 (2010) (“The public’s 
frustration [with TARP] has led to a general rise in populist political rhetoric 
and has polluted the policy discussion in many other areas.”). 
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involved in managing the business—both the government em-
ployees and the businesspeople—have their own interests. 
These interests may be antithetical to the government, the 
business, or both. Given the conflicts of interest that arise at 
multiple levels of decisionmaking in both government and pri-
vate companies, it should not be surprising that government 
management of companies is often problematic.  
Conflicts of interest are notoriously difficult to address. 
Government ethics laws address them with substantive rules 
that control government employees’ behavior10 and disclosure 
rules covering their private-sector employment, investments, 
and other subjects.11 Corporate law and securities law, as well 
as industry-specific regulations such as those applicable to 
banks and broker dealers, address problems in companies with 
substantive rules and disclosure rules. In both government and 
business, law has had mixed success in changing the way indi-
viduals behave. Conflicts of interest and their concealment con-
tinue on a scale that most observers find troubling. This Article 
discusses the difficulties conflicts pose for law, how law at-
tempts to deal with conflicts, and why law often falls short. 
This Article also discusses ways to limit the damage conflicts of 
interest can cause. We focus on one important reason why con-
flicts of interest have not been well-addressed: the set of con-
flicts that can effectively be regulated using standard legal 
rules is a small subset of the potential conflicts that may arise. 
We explore why this is so, showing why the conflicts that arise 
when government is involved in business are particularly diffi-
cult for the law to address.  
In both business and government, we can distinguish be-
tween two types of conflicts. One type traditionally and more 
effectively dealt with by law is a direct conflict, involving self-
interest narrowly construed. Two common examples are the 
government official who is negotiating for a private sector job 
with an employer with whom he is doing business on behalf of 
the government and the corporate executive who is seeking to 
hire his close relative. These types of acts can simply be prohib-
ited or scrutinized carefully. For expository ease, we will call 
these the easy cases.  
 
 10. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 208 (2006) (prohibiting government officials from 
participating in certain matters in which they have a financial interest). 
 11. See, e.g., Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 
Stat. 1824, amended by Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 
Stat. 1716 (requiring periodic financial disclosure by government officials). 
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But the other type of conflict—the hard cases—presents 
considerably more difficulties. Any time a government or corpo-
rate official acts (or does not act), he could be seeking to ad-
vance interests other than those he is supposed to be advanc-
ing. These illegitimate interests include self-interest narrowly 
construed; they also include interests of others with whom the 
official may feel personal or professional kinship, such as a 
former colleague, or someone similarly situated to the official or 
whose favor the official would like to curry. Some of these in-
terests could be characterized as self-interest broadly con-
strued. Others are more a matter of bias or perspective, such as 
a former corporate executive who becomes a government official 
favoring his former colleagues. Cases are hard enough when 
the question to be determined is whether an illegitimate inter-
est is present. Complicating matters, a conflict might exist 
among several legitimate interests a corporate or government 
official could simultaneously be seeking to advance, as well as 
what may be an illegitimate interest. Law cannot be ever-
present, micromanaging the conduct of so many actors and 
making intricate determinations of true intent. In this Article, 
we argue that these hard cases present a critical challenge, one 
that must be far better met if business and government are to 
function well both independently and when government is in-
volved in business.  
We sometimes refer to the hard cases as cases of “structur-
al bias.” The term comes from corporate law: it refers to the bi-
ases board members may have, consciously and unconsciously, 
to defer to management and to one another. They defer because 
their interests are best served by doing so, because they share a 
similar perspective on many matters, including compensation 
and appropriate (high) levels of deference to management, and 
because they are connected to one another through a web of 
business ties.12 Substituting government positions for “board 
member” and “manager,” and “political ties” for “business ties,” 
the term and concept does an excellent job of delineating the 
hard cases in government as well.  
Part I discusses the conflict-of-interest problem in general 
as well as the fiduciary principle, and considers the particular 
conflicts at issue when government is involved in business. 
This Part also elaborates on our characterization of conflicts 
cases as “easy” or “hard” and contrasts the law’s relative suc-
 
 12. See generally Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Sub-
stantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 824 (2004).  
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cess in dealing with the former with its lack of success in deal-
ing with the latter.  
Part II discusses how corporate law deals with conflicts of 
interest for business managers, including both easy cases—
breaches of the traditional duty of loyalty—and hard cases. The 
easy cases are easy because triggering facts are usually 
straightforward to identify; the law then provides for close 
scrutiny. But close scrutiny is not appropriate or feasible for all 
matters. The law’s choice is to defer to the board’s business 
judgment unless there are strong indications that it should not 
do so.13 Some, and perhaps many, commentators think the law 
generally defers too much.14 But no one has thus far developed 
a viable alternative that would sufficiently address the hard 
cases. Law’s power in dealing with conflicts of interest in busi-
ness is thus limited, leaving many problematic conflicts unad-
dressed.  
Part III discusses how some conflicts of interest in govern-
ment are addressed in government ethics law. Personal con-
flicts of interest, the revolving door between government and 
business, and the influence of private money on political cam-
paigns are several of the most serious problems. The law effec-
tively addresses some of these conflicts but many of them are 
not effectively addressed, particularly those that concern the 
systematic corruption of government. Ethics laws forbid gov-
ernment officials from holding certain stocks,15 preclude their 
participation in certain matters involving their spouses, and 
even forbid them from participating in particular party matters 
in which recent prior employers are a party.16 But ethics laws 
cannot prevent people from acting in all ways that advance il-
legitimate interests over those of the public. When government 
depends upon private contractors to do its work, these problems 
are even more difficult to resolve. 
 
 13. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d. 173, 181–83 (1968) 
(holding that the court would not intervene in the business decisions of direc-
tors absent “fraud, illegality or conflict of interest”). 
 14. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitaliz-
ing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 
394, 409–10 (2005) (stating that “our society has tacitly agreed to spare [cor-
porate directors] any significant legal liability for failing to perform their du-
ties as board members” and that the business judgment rule is just one man-
ifestation of directors’ legal untouchability). 
 15. See 18 U.S.C. § 208. 
 16. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502 (2010). 
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Part IV gives examples of how conflicts of interest can 
compound when government manages companies. This problem 
is not new: the earliest examples we discuss involve events that 
occurred several hundred years ago. England’s South Sea Com-
pany, a government-sponsored trading company, was actually 
used as an investment bank to finance government debt and 
enrich Tory sympathizers until its stock crashed in 1720.17 
Another example involves Alexander Hamilton’s First Bank of 
the United States and Nicholas Biddle’s Second Bank of the 
United States, institutions that served an important purpose in 
our financial system but that were sufficiently tainted by cor-
ruption that they could not survive politically.18 More recent 
examples include Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the govern-
ment-sponsored mortgage companies that had a substantial 
role in the 2008 financial crisis.19 
In Part V, we discuss how both business and government 
can address the hard cases of conflicts of interest. The first step 
will be recognizing that conflicts are pervasive. The best count-
erweight to conflicts of interest is a strong commitment to per-
sonal and professional responsibility that empowers a business 
or government decisionmaker to overcome the motivation to 
advance interests other than those he is supposed to be advanc-
ing. Decisionmakers in business and in government should be 
firmly committed to principles of ethics, not just to obeying 
narrowly defined rules.  
Next, it is important to look for other ways to mitigate the 
effects of conflicts of interest. Dispersing decisionmaking 
among different groups of people—for example, shareholders as 
well as directors in a corporation or different agencies in gov-
ernment—could be part of the solution. Both shareholder over-
sight and congressional oversight should be more aggressive. 
Furthermore, collective decisionmaking and oversight functions 
are aided by transparency. The more information that can be 
disclosed about factors that might create conflicts of interest—
for example, personal relationships of company directors, and 
prior employment and client relationships of government offi-
cials—the better. Finally, the greatest source of conflicts of in-
terest in government is campaign contributions. Unless and 
until something is done about our system of campaign finance, 
conflicts of interest will be an ever-present threat. 
 
 17. See infra notes 141–49.  
 18. See infra notes 150–67. 
 19. See infra notes 170–90. 
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I.  THE FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLE AND CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST IN GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS   
The antithesis of conflicts of interest is the fiduciary prin-
ciple: government and business actors are agents who are sup-
posed to be acting for their principals, not for their own inter-
ests (or the interests of others besides their principals). Agents 
and principals not infrequently have conflicting interests; the 
agents have both the ability and the incentive to serve interests 
other than those of their principals, and they sometimes do so 
at their principals’ expense.  
Government ethics law and corporate law on fiduciary duty 
both have as their objective to reinforce the fiduciary principle. 
Persons trusted with positions of responsibility are fiduciaries, 
charged with serving the interests of persons to whom they owe 
fiduciary duties, preferring those interests to any other inter-
ests. Officials in all branches of government owe fiduciary obli-
gations to the public.20 Corporate officials serve the corporation 
and its shareholders, and owe some duties to corporate em-
ployees, customers, and the community.21 William Henry Van-
derbilt was wrong when he said “the public be d—ned.”22 Busi-
 
 20. See Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet? 
An Answer from Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 74 (“Numerous 
courts have recognized the fiduciary obligation of government employees, even 
in the absence of specific legislative or regulatory endorsements of such duties, 
and these courts have imposed fiduciary-like remedies in response to violations 
of the conflict and influence components of that obligation.”); see also Exec. 
Order No. 12,674 § 101(a), 3 C.F.R. 215 (1990) (“Public service is a public 
trust.”), as modified by Exec. Order No. 12,731, 3 C.F.R. 306 (1991) (codified at 
5 U.S.C. §§ 7301, 7351, 7353 (2006)).  
 21. Commentators are divided as to the extent of duties owed to parties 
who are not shareholders. Some commentators emphasize duties to sharehold-
ers; others emphasize duties also owed to “other constituencies.” See, e.g., Mar-
leen A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law 
to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 954–
65 (1993) (arguing that the fiduciary duties of directors should be extended to 
employees). Most of this debate is over what directors should do, not what they 
are required to do. There are very few (if any) cases where courts have re-
quired managers to favor shareholders over other constituencies absent a con-
flict of interest for the managers themselves, such as management resistance 
to a hostile takeover where they may be acting to preserve their own jobs. 
 22. See DOW’S DICTIONARY OF RAILWAY QUOTES 287 (Andrew Dow ed., 
2006). William Henry Vanderbilt, president of the New York Central Railroad 
and numerous other railroads, was widely reported to have uttered these words 
on October 8, 1882. Vanderbilt was in his private railroad car when Clarence 
Dresser, a reporter, entered the car and demanded an interview, vaguely refer-
ring to the public’s right to know. Id. Vanderbilt angrily blurted out his re-
sponse, which was immediately published in newspapers around the country. Id. 
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ness people have an obligation to seek profits, but they also 
have an obligation to contribute to the general welfare. Busi-
ness people violate that obligation when they engage in conduct 
that imposes negative externalities on people not in a position 
to seek appropriate redress. Indeed, business people have an 
obligation to do their best to prevent destruction ensuing from 
their activities. Both government officials and business manag-
ers have an obligation to deal openly and honestly with other 
people and to use prudence in dealing with other people’s prop-
erty.23  
Fiduciary principles in government ethics law have evolved 
differently than fiduciary principles in corporate law.24 In cor-
porate law, shareholders can sue corporate directors and offic-
ers for breach of fiduciary duty as well as vote directors out of 
office. Government ethics law, on the other hand, does not al-
low citizens to sue for breach of fiduciary duty. Voting politi-
cians out of office is, in many cases, the only direct remedy for 
the public. Federal ethics laws, congressional oversight laws, 
procurement laws, and other regulations supposedly fill the 
gap.25 
Transparency and accountability are the twin objectives of 
most regulatory schemes designed to uphold the fiduciary prin-
ciple, whether in business organizations or in government.26 In 
laws regulating public companies, securities law traditionally 
has addressed transparency and corporate law has addressed 
accountability. After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200227 and the 
 
 23. Trust is a critical part of the fiduciary principle in business as it is in 
government. As Professor Tamar Frankel has pointed out, commentators and 
policymakers have too often assumed that business managers are selfish eco-
nomic actors. There has been insufficient attention paid to promoting trust as 
a moral value. This cynical approach has been partially to blame for our prob-
lems with corporate governance as manager opportunism becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy. See TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA’S 
BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD 76–77 (2006) (arguing that financial dis-
honesty should be repudiated by citizens who aspire to honesty and reject atti-
tudes and assumptions that underlie corporate scandals); see also Tamar 
Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 809–11 (1983) (explaining that 
from the very structure and nature of the fiduciary relationship stems the risk 
that the fiduciary will abuse the power entrusted to her, creating the need for 
legal protections). 
 24. See RICHARD W. PAINTER, GETTING THE GOVERNMENT AMERICA 
DESERVES: HOW ETHICS REFORM CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE 3 (2009). 
 25. See id. 
 26. See id. at 4.  
 27. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
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Dodd-Frank Act of 2010,28 federal securities law, and some-
times, the criminal law, have reached aggressively into both 
areas.29 As discussed more fully in Part II below, these laws do 
not effectively address a broad range of problems in corporate 
management—sometimes mismanagement—that are attribut-
able to the types of conflicts that we identify as the hard cases. 
In government ethics, both transparency and accountabili-
ty rules come from the government itself, which presents the 
unique situation that the largest economic actor in our society 
is essentially self-regulating. As discussed below, government 
does a relatively good job of addressing problems arising from 
some isolated and easily identifiable conflicts of interest—such 
as personal financial holdings—and a relatively poor job of ad-
dressing broader concerns arising out of the hard cases of con-
flicting interest that potentially affect every decision. The 
hardest conflicts to resolve—for example, conflicting loyalties 
based upon personal and business ties to special interests—are 
not effectively addressed by substantive ethics rules.30 
When government is involved in bailing out or managing a 
business, the potential for conflicts is pervasive, and some of 
the conflicts may be intractable. The government has an obliga-
tion to protect taxpayers’ stake in the bailed-out companies; 
however, it also has broader obligations such as having a pru-
dent monetary policy and protecting investors from inflated 
markets. When the government wants to sell some of its stake 
in General Motors, AIG, and other bailed-out companies, it is in 
a position to influence—even inflate—the markets in which 
those securities will be sold, the apparent value of financial as-
 
 28. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 29. See PAINTER, supra note 24, at 14 (“Criminal statutes and prosecu-
tions . . . are increasingly used to address misconduct by corporate officers and 
directors. This trend was already prevalent by the 1990s, but accelerated after 
the Enron scandal and passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.”). 
 30. Another comparison can usefully be made between business and gov-
ernment: 
Corporate managers and government officials also share another sim-
ilarity: the power of incumbency. Absent egregious neglect of transpar-
ency in their dealings with investors or egregious departures from the 
accountability principle, corporate managers have enormous staying 
power. It is difficult for shareholders to throw them out. Dishonest or 
self-serving conduct falling short of the worst is difficult to control. In 
government also, officeholders have an advantage over anyone who 
challenges their authority. In both contexts, poorly performing fidu-
ciaries are often hard to get rid of. 
Id. at 5. 
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sets held by those companies, and the market value of its own 
investment. Not all of the things government might do to max-
imize the value of its own position in these bailout transactions 
will help investors or the economy generally, yet there are com-
pelling political, if not budgetary, reasons for government to do 
everything it can to maximize the value of its own holdings. No 
government official wants to tell the public that taxpayers took 
a huge loss bailing out companies, particularly when executives 
of these companies still get paid far more than the average tax-
payer. 
Difficult ethical questions arise. What should the govern-
ment do to increase the value of its stake in these companies? 
What should government not do? How should government bal-
ance its interest as an investor with its role as a regulator of fi-
nancial markets? Is the benefit to taxpayers if the government 
gains more money from selling its stake in these companies an 
appropriate reason for the government to temporarily prop up 
markets into which that stock will be sold? If so, what are legit-
imate ways for government to prop up these markets?  
These are scarcely the only ethical issues when govern-
ment is involved in managing companies. AIG, Fannie Mae, 
and Freddie Mac are notable examples in which government 
funds were used to pay outsized executive bonuses.31 Both the 
government decisionmakers who invested taxpayer money in 
these enterprises and the business decisionmakers who were 
their political allies and got the bonuses had many conflicts of 
interest. To what extent were these decisions affected by con-
flicts of interest in both government and business? 
In hard cases such as those described in the preceding par-
agraph, it is not clear if the fiduciary is acting in furtherance of 
one or more legitimate interests, an illegitimate interest, or 
some combination thereof. This is what makes hard cases hard: 
because of the multitude of interests involved, sorting out the 
legitimate from the illegitimate can be close to impossible. The 
law will necessarily fall short in dealing with this category. In-
quiries into motives are not the law’s strong suit, and where 
there are several legitimate interests, the case may be hard 
conceptually as well as practically. An outright prohibition is 
unwarranted and in any event infeasible, and close scrutiny 
 
 31. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, At A.I.G., Huge Bonuses 
After $170 Billion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 
WLNR 4926991; Charles Duhigg, Big Bonuses at Fannie and Freddie Draw 
Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2009, at B1, available at 2009 WLNR 6331273. 
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would be exceedingly expensive. Corporate law and government 
ethics law have some doctrines designed to deal with these 
hard cases, but their success is quite limited. As a conceptual 
matter, the ideal course is apparent: the actor’s motive deter-
mines whether his action was conflicted. But the inquiry is dif-
ficult and expensive; moreover, mixed motives are always a 
possibility.32  
The following are examples where there may be two possi-
ble interests, one legitimate and one illegitimate.  
(1) A government official dealing with a private contractor 
may be interested in obtaining a job with the contractor. As 
long as no job negotiations are occurring, how would the gov-
ernment official’s interest be sufficiently obvious that law can 
address the problem? Presumably, it is not feasible to prohibit 
all dealings between government officials and those who might 
later offer them a job. Moreover, whether or not the official 
wants a job with the contractor, his dealings with the contrac-
tor on behalf of the government may properly serve the gov-
ernment’s interests. 
(2) A corporate executive who is CEO of company A and al-
so a director of company B may vote for a generous compensa-
tion package for company B’s CEO because he thinks the com-
pany CEO warrants this package. He may (or merely) be 
hoping to raise the threshold of CEO pay and to reinforce a 
norm of director acquiescence to high CEO pay packages.33  
(3) An ex-banker in government may make decisions that 
favor bankers at his old firm, perhaps out of a genuine convic-
tion that the decisions best serve the public interest, and (or) 
because he empathizes with his former colleagues.  
Even more difficult are situations involving several legiti-
mate interests, as well as, perhaps, an illegitimate interest. A 
few examples follow. 
(1) A successful financial institution might be deciding 
whether to expand into other business areas that are potential-
ly lucrative but that also pose a risk for its creditors. Among 
 
 32. The potential for self-serving bias compounds the difficulty of deter-
mining whether a conflict exists. A person might convince himself that the 
course of action that is in his self-interest is in fact in the interests of the per-
son or entity he is supposed to be serving. For example, the CEO may convince 
himself that the friend from whom he may want favors in the future really is 
the best person for the company to hire.  
 33. See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and 
Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833, 853 (2007) [hereinafter Hill & McDonnell, 
Disney].  
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the legitimate interests potentially benefiting from the expan-
sion are diversified shareholders, who would gain if the new 
business areas are profitable. The creditors, who do not share 
in the upside profits from a risky venture, will probably see the 
situation differently. The financial institution’s management, 
however, might have its own illegitimate motives: for instance, 
the new business areas may be ones in which companies often 
pay very large bonuses to their executives.34  
(2) A company may have to choose whether to automate 
some of its operations in order to ultimately lower its costs. 
Among the competing legitimate interests are those of the 
shareholders in higher profits and those of employees in keep-
ing their jobs. The management may also have its own illegiti-
mate motives; the CEO may have personal ties with the CEO of 
the company likely to be hired to do the automation.  
(3) A government official might decide to prefer labor credi-
tors over other creditors in bailing out an automobile company, 
both because labor unions contributed to his political campaign 
and because he believes his constituents want him to prefer la-
bor over other interests.  
(4) A high-ranking Treasury Department official has been 
required by government ethics lawyers to sell all of his stock in 
his prior employer, an investment bank, but many of his close 
friends still work at the investment bank. He made most of his 
fortune there, and but for his successful career at the invest-
ment bank, he would not have the prestigious government job 
he now has. When the investment bank wants something from 
the Treasury Department—for example, a bailout of some other 
entity that owes the investment bank money—the official may 
find it difficult to say “no” to the bank, whatever his view may 
be of the merits. The request, however, also might be for some-
thing that the official believes is in the best interests of the 
overall economy, or perhaps even something that the official be-
lieves is necessary to prevent economic collapse. Sorting out 
why the official did what he did in this situation could be ex-
tremely difficult, and in any event would be an exercise of little 
practical value. 
 
 34. This is not merely hypothetical; after the repeal of the Glass-Steagall 
Act’s restrictions on mixing commercial banking and investment banking, 
many commercial bank holding companies faced exactly this choice, and many 
decided to enter these more lucrative—and riskier—lines of business, perhaps 
to benefit their shareholders, but perhaps also to benefit their managers. 
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We next consider how corporate law and government ethics 
law approach these types of conflicts.  
II.  CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN BUSINESS   
Corporate law is in some respects better situated to deal 
with the problem of conflicts than is government ethics law. 
Business conflicts are more tractable, and there are people with 
ability, incentive, and an appropriate forum—shareholders, 
who can pursue lawsuits (and use proxy contests and other 
remedies)—to call the corporate officers to account. Still, the 
law falls short. 
In business, as in any activity conducted by agents, the po-
tential for conflicts of interest is pervasive. State corporate law 
addresses conflicts of interest by imposing a fiduciary duty on 
directors and officers.35 Directors and officers owe fiduciary du-
ties to their principal, the corporation (and its shareholders). 
They may have duties to other constituencies, such as em-
ployees, customers, and the greater community. But there are 
other interests that are clearly illegitimate. They should not be 
serving these interests, or their own interests, at the expense of 
the principal.  
For certain types of breaches of fiduciary duty, law does a 
passable job. These are the cases where conflicts are 
straightforward, stark, and amenable of somewhat formulaic 
description—easy cases, where an outright prohibition, or at 
least close scrutiny, is appropriate. Corporate law typically 
adopts the latter approach, as discussed below. Difficulties 
quickly arise in other cases, where a corporate actor may or 
may not be serving illegitimate interests. The law has adopted 
a number of intermediate standards providing for some scruti-
ny, although less than the scrutiny involved in the easy cases.36 
Law in this area has not been nearly as successful as it has in 
the easy cases.37  
Recall the two categories of conflicts of interest described 
in the Introduction. The first category, the easy cases, corre-
sponds with the duty of loyalty as traditionally conceived. The 
 
 35. See generally Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter: 
The Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769 (2007) [hereinafter 
Hill & McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter], and Hill & McDonnell, Disney, supra note 
33, from which some of this Part is adapted. 
 36. See Hill & McDonnell, Disney, supra note 33, at 837–40; Hill & 
McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter, supra note 35, at 1791–94.  
 37. See Hill & McDonnell, Disney, supra note 33, at 837–40. 
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second category consists of the hard cases. A fiduciary may be 
pursuing a legitimate interest, an illegitimate interest, or both. 
In some instances, there are only two possibilities—the interest 
is legitimate or it is not. A common example in corporate law 
involves doing something because it favors a crony. The very 
act that is problematic when motivated by cronyism might be 
acceptable if not so motivated. The difficulty arises because the 
law is quite poor at discerning true motives. Complications 
multiply where there are several possible legitimate interests 
as well as possible illegitimate interests. Should a company be 
moving some of its operations to a tax haven to lower its taxes? 
How should a company balance the interests of employees in 
keeping their jobs with those of shareholders in higher profits? 
The law does not generally get involved in such decisions, leav-
ing them to the managers’ business judgment. This is so even 
though the managers may actually be motivated by cronyism or 
some other illegitimate interest. For instance, the CEO’s good 
friend is an executive at the company that can provide equip-
ment to automate the company’s operations; the company can 
reduce its labor costs by automating, but the CEO’s motivation 
is to send business to his friend. The law only gets involved in a 
small subset of mixed-motive situations, such as those involv-
ing Revlon duties38 when a company is up for sale. In scrutiniz-
ing a transaction under Revlon, a court might find that a 
board’s claim to be acting in the interests of its employees in re-
jecting a takeover bid of an acquirer contemplating workforce 
reductions in favor of a more management-solicitous bid was a 
pretext for preferring its own interests.39 But again, absent 
Revlon-type considerations, the law generally will defer to 
management’s choice as between legitimate interests, even 
though the more legitimate interests there are, the easier it 
may be to disguise an illegitimate interest. 
We begin with the first category—the easy cases. The best 
example is self-dealing “where a director, officer, or controlling 
 
 38. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 
173, 179–80 (Del. 1986).  
 39. This is akin to what happened in Revlon. Directors justified their ac-
tion in accepting a bid to be acquired by a company that would “support” the 
value of certain Revlon promissory notes in part by arguing that it was taken 
to advance the interests of creditors. The court noted that “while concern for 
various corporate constituencies is proper when addressing a takeover threat, 
that principle is limited by the requirement that there be some rationally re-
lated benefit accruing to the stockholders.” Id. at 176. Indeed, the court be-
lieved that the directors were principally acting to benefit themselves—to 
avoid lawsuits by the holders of the notes. 
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shareholder has clearly identifiable, specific monetary interests 
at stake in a decision that puts her own self-interest at odds 
with the interests of the corporation.”40 Recurring fact situa-
tions include hiring of a spouse or other close family member 
and transactions between a director or officer and the corpora-
tion. 
Courts carefully scrutinize transactions involving self-
dealing. When there is enough reason to suppose the transac-
tions may be tainted, close scrutiny is warranted; moreover, 
discouraging such transactions may be desirable. The law spec-
ifies methods by which transactions between an officer or direc-
tor and the corporation may be “cleansed:” 
In Delaware, these three methods come from section 144 of the Dela-
ware General Corporation Law; most states have a variant of this 
statute. One method of validating a conflicted transaction is to get 
approval of the transaction by the disinterested and independent 
members of the board. . . . The second method of validating conflicted 
transactions is to get approval of disinterested shareholders. . . . The 
third method for validating conflicted transactions is for the defend-
ant to show that the transaction was entirely fair to the corporation. 
This involves demonstrating both that the corporation followed a fair 
procedure and that the transaction was on substantively fair terms.41 
If one of these methods is used, a defendant director or officer is 
unlikely to be found liable for breach. The transaction will be 
subject to judicial review, but the standard of review will be 
deferential to the defendants.  
The Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) also has pro-
visions on “Directors’ Conflicting Interest Transactions.”42 The 
MBCA provides for validation via disinterested director or dis-
interested shareholder approval, defining in great specificity all 
relevant terms.  
Other common conflict situations include taking a corpo-
rate opportunity and competing with the corporation. Here too, 
there are varying approaches specified, with disclosure and ap-
proval of disinterested parties being typical solutions.43  
The law is most comfortable dealing with these and other 
classic loyalty breaches, where the officer or director’s interest 
is clearly opposed to that of the corporation.44 The easiest cases 
 
 40. Hill & McDonnell, Disney, supra note 33, at 835. 
 41. Id. at 835–36 (citations omitted).  
 42. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60–.63 (1985). 
 43. See generally id. intro. cmt., subch. F, § 4; id. § 8.70; FRANKLIN A. 
GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 382–407 (2d ed. 2010).  
 44. The law should probably be less comfortable than it is giving defer-
ence to an interested decision sanitized by disinterested directors, given that 
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are those where discouraging the types of transactions at issue 
is usually appropriate. A corporation can presumably function 
quite well without engaging in transactions with its officers or 
directors or hiring their family members. The law has more dif-
ficulty appropriately defining what constitutes taking a corpo-
rate opportunity and competing with the corporation. There are 
obvious perils to both too-broad and too-narrow definitions. The 
more limits a corporation puts on an officer or director’s behav-
ior, the more the corporation may discourage good candidates 
from taking the job.45 But an unduly narrow definition is also 
unsatisfactory, allowing for behavior that benefits the officer or 
director while harming the corporation.  
The law has yet more difficulty when the conduct at issue 
is not paradigmatic self-dealing. Consider the following scenar-
io. X is an elementary school principal. The father of some stu-
dents at the school, the CEO of a huge entertainment company, 
chooses her to be on the board of the company. The fee for 
board attendance for each meeting is more than X’s entire an-
nual salary. X effectively serves at the CEO’s pleasure. What is 
the law to do about this situation—consider any vote of X’s a 
product of an illegitimate interest? To many people, common 
sense would suggest an affirmative answer to the question. But 
a court faced with precisely this situation deemed this director 
to be independent and not dominated by the CEO who selected 
her.  
The case in question involved the Disney Corporation.46 
Shareholders challenged a decision by the Disney board to hire 
a friend of the CEO as president, to give the president a gener-
ous severance package and, one year after he became president, 
and when it became clear that his employment with Disney 
was not a success, to pay him severance in excess of $140 mil-
lion. One argument shareholders made was that the board was 
dominated by Michael Eisner, the CEO. The court held that 
most of the board of directors—including the principal of the 
elementary school that Eisner’s children had once attended and 
 
even these directors probably have some structural bias. See infra notes 56–59 
and accompanying text. One of the authors of this Article is co-writing an ar-
ticle suggesting how courts should deal with independent director cleansing of 
interested transactions.  
 45. This is of course a far more significant concern as to outside directors, 
who only devote some of their time to the corporation, than officers, who pre-
sumably have limited time to be involved in an outside venture. 
 46. For a discussion of the case, see generally Hill & McDonnell, Disney, 
supra note 33, at 843–45. 
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whose salary as a teacher was low relative to her director com-
pensation—was not dominated by Eisner.47  
The court reasoned that to deem the elementary school 
principal dominated 
would be to discourage the membership on corporate boards of people 
of less-than extraordinary means. Such “regular folks” would face al-
legations of being dominated by other board members, merely be-
cause of the relatively substantial compensation provided by the 
board membership compared to their outside salaries. I am especially 
unwilling to facilitate such a result.48 
Regardless of the court’s finding that Disney’s board met 
the legal standard for independence, the general consensus was 
that as a practical matter, the board was not independent. An 
article in BusinessWeek around the time of these events stated 
that: 
Disney’s directors have won the dubious distinction of being named 
the worst board in America in BusinessWeek’s second annual analysis 
of the state of corporate governance. Institutional investors and 
boardroom watchers scorn what they see as a meek, handpicked 
group, many of whom have long ties to Eisner or the company.49 
Another Disney director was the president of Georgetown 
University, to which Eisner had donated $1 million (and from 
which one of Eisner’s sons had graduated).50 The court found 
that this director also was not dominated by Eisner.51 One rea-
son the court gave is that the director was a Jesuit, and hence 
unable to keep his director’s fee.52  
To be fair, the court did find some of the directors to be 
dominated, including Eisner’s personal lawyer53 and an archi-
tect whose firm received fees from Disney.54 And the plaintiffs 
successfully repled their allegations and were granted a trial. 
The plaintiffs lost, but the record developed at trial did suggest 
more independence in the directors’ actions than might initially 
have seemed to be the case. The Delaware Court of Chancery, 
in announcing why the defendants would prevail, articulated a 
 
 47. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I ), 731 A.2d 342, 
356–61, 380 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Brehm v. 
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 48. Id. at 360. 
 49. John A. Byrne et al., The Best and Worst Boards, BUS. WK., Dec. 8, 
1997, at 90, 90. 
 50. See Disney I, 731 A.2d at 359. 
 51. See id. at 360. 
 52. See id. at 358–59. 
 53. See id. at 360. 
 54. See id. at 357–58. 
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very high bar for plaintiff success where traditional self-dealing 
or other canonical duty of loyalty claims are not at issue: that 
the directors have to act in “bad faith.”55 In the final opinion is-
sued in this series of cases, the Delaware Supreme Court held 
that  
[a] failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the 
fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advanc-
ing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts with 
the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary in-
tentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrat-
ing a conscious disregard for his duties. There may be other examples 
of bad faith yet to be proven or alleged, but these three are the most 
salient.56 
The doctrinal label for issues raised by the Disney board is 
“structural bias.” The term has not been precisely defined, but 
one commentator’s definition captures what it means:  
The term “structural bias” generally refers to the prejudice that 
members of the board of directors may have in favor of one another 
and of management. It is said to be the result of the “common cultural 
bond” and “natural empathy and collegiality” shared by most direc-
tors, the “economic[ ] or psychological dependen[cy] upon or tie[s] to 
the corporation’s executives, particularly its chief executive,” and the 
“process of director selection and socialization, which incumbent 
management dominates.”57 
The “pernicious golden rule”—a corporate manager’s credo to 
treat another manager as he would like to be treated—aptly 
describes one facet of structural bias.58 Many directors are 
CEOs of other companies. Director A of company X is CEO of 
company Y. He defers to X CEO because he, in his capacity as 
Y CEO, would like his board to defer to him. The phenomenon 
is particularly evident in the case of compensation decisions.  
The bulk of the hard cases are classic structural bias cases. 
Another closely related category is where board members may 
be acting to further their own interests instead of, or in addi-
tion to, those of their cronies. These cases can be classified as 
“suspect motive” cases.59 The board favors a takeover by A 
rather than B (perhaps) because A will retain both the officers 
 
 55. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 753–55 (Del. 
Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). Of course, the other intermediate 
standards established for particular types of fact patterns might yield liability 
under different doctrines. The court did not establish “good faith” as the sole 
alternative duty to the traditional duty of loyalty. 
 56. Id. at 755–56. 
 57. Velasco, supra note 12, at 824.  
 58. See Hill & McDonnell, Disney, supra note 33, at 853. 
 59. See Hill & McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter, supra note 35, at 1780–81. 
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and directors. For purposes of this Article, we will refer to 
many of these cases as structural bias cases as well: while the 
doctrinal specifics may differ, the differences are not important 
for our thesis.  
These types of potential conflicts are pervasive. Every deci-
sion a board member makes may reflect a conflict of interest. 
Not surprisingly, courts are hard pressed to deal with the issue. 
They can scarcely micromanage every business decision. In-
deed, they typically do just the opposite, giving considerable 
business judgment deference, unless confronted with a case of 
clear conflict. When boards are inclined to be overly deferential 
to corporate management and when there is considerable mu-
tual back-scratching, some of what occurs at corporations will 
serve the interests of corporate managers at the expense of the 
interests they are supposed to serve, most notably those of the 
corporation and its shareholders.  
In the last decade and a half there has been increasing 
emphasis on encouraging more independent boards in hopes 
that they will be better monitors.60 This sounds sensible, but 
the key is the definition of “independence.” What is needed is 
independence in spirit, not independence determined by refer-
ence to some relationship one can formulaically describe, such 
as close kinship or a business partnership or contractual con-
nection. There is no good way to discern independence in spir-
it.61 Thus, kinship and business relationships are used as prox-
ies, with the relationships at issue being narrowly and 
specifically defined.62 People like the elementary school prin-
cipal and the Georgetown president are treated as independent, 
as are CEOs of other companies, even though each of these may 
 
 60. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of 
Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1717, 1781 (2006). 
 61. See Nell Minow, Editor, The Corporate Library, Remarks at the Na-
tional Investor Relations Institute and Public Affairs Council’s Symposium on 
Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism (Dec. 12, 2002) (transcript on 
file with authors). 
 62. It should be noted, though, that while the text mostly discusses state 
corporate law, much of the law governing independence of directors is federal 
law. See generally Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
588 (2003); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV 2491 (2005). It 
also should be noted that there is significant pressure for “independent” 
boards from institutional shareholder groups. Again, independence is defined 
by formula. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. EMPS. RET. SYS., GLOBAL PRINCIPLES OF 
ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 8–9 (2010) [hereinafter CALPERS, 
GLOBAL PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.calpers-governance.org/docs-sof/ 
principles/2010-5-2-global-principles-of-accountable-corp-gov.pdf. 
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be biased for the reasons previously discussed. People who do 
not meet the formal criteria for independence for some reason 
such as having contractual relationships with the company 
might be truly independent and able to monitor management 
effectively. Increasingly, state law in this area is being supple-
mented with federal law. Indeed, “independence” as state cor-
porate law—and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act—has defined it can be 
the worst of all worlds: “independent” directors may not know 
enough about the company’s business to be good monitors of its 
management but may still have a structural bias in favor of 
management such that they do not want to know—and may not 
care—if management is hurting the company. “Independent” 
and willfully ignorant directors can stick their heads in the 
sand while management does as it pleases.63 Meanwhile, be-
cause of the requirements and pressure to have mostly “inde-
pendent” boards and particular board committees that are all 
or majority independent,64 well-qualified directors who know a 
great deal about the company and do not meet formulaic stan-
dards of independence are selected less often. 
An excellent example of structural bias manifesting itself 
in board inaction occurred at Enron. Of its fourteen members, 
only three were employees or former employees of Enron. The 
other eleven included various well-respected (and business-
savvy) individuals such as Robert Jaedicke, an emeritus ac-
counting professor and former dean of the Stanford Business 
School, who headed the Audit Committee.65 
But “[i]t turn[ed] out that the independence of virtually 
every board member, including Audit Committee members, was 
undermined by side payments of one kind or another. Inde-
pendence also was compromised by the bonds of long service 
 
 63. The American approach to board “independence” differs markedly 
from the approach to corporate governance in some other countries where 
most directors have a contractual relationship—or work for a financial institu-
tion having a contractual relationship—with the company. See Wulf A. Kaal & 
Richard W. Painter, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard: Constraints 
on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in Germany and the United States, 40 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1433, 1452–53 (2010). Commentators in those countries 
are skeptical about whether the American approach to “independence” actual-
ly works, or instead burdens companies with directors who are unfamiliar 
with the company’s operations while still being subject to structural bias. See 
id. at 1473–74. 
 64. See, e.g., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A (2010), available 
at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/Sections/; see also CALPERS, GLOBAL 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 62, at 8–9. 
 65. See Hill & O’Hara, supra note 60, at 1783. 
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and familiarity.”66 Enron’s board did not look hard at what was 
happening in the company, allowing it to run a shell game and 
eventually collapse.67 In one glaring example, it approved a 
waiver of its conflict-of-interest policies to allow its chief finan-
cial officer, Andrew Fastow, to run (as a general partner) a 
partnership doing business with Enron.68  
As the Enron case, and most recently the debacle at Citi-
group, Lehman Brothers, and many other large financial insti-
tutions, demonstrated, board inaction and/or willful ignorance 
sometimes rooted in structural bias can be far more devastat-
ing for shareholders and the economy as a whole than the 
board actions that prompted the Disney case.  
To be fair, courts sometimes make the fact-intensive in-
quiry that exposes and may defeat structural bias. Consider the 
following language from Vice Chancellor Strine’s opinion in In 
re Oracle Co. Derivative Litigation, in which a committee of 
“independent” directors was formed to decide whether to ter-
minate a lawsuit against some of Oracle’s executives for insider 
trading.69 The Special Litigation Committee (SLC) decided to 
terminate the lawsuit.70 The court, however, held that the SLC 
had not met its burden of showing that it was independent:  
Of course, the SLC says these facts [alleging connections between 
Larry Ellison of Oracle and Stanford, where two members of the SLC 
were professors] are meaningless because Stanford rejected Ellison’s 
child for admission. I am not sure what to make of this fact, but it 
surely cannot bear the heavy weight the SLC gives it. The aftermath 
of denying Ellison’s child admission might, after all, as likely mani-
fest itself in a desire on the part of the Stanford community never to 
offend Ellison again, lest he permanently write off Stanford as a poss-
ible object of his charitable aims—as the sort of thing that acts as not 
one, but two strikes, leading the batter to choke up on the bat so as to 
be even more careful not to miss the next pitch. Suffice to say that af-
ter the rejection took place, it did not keep Ellison from making public 
statements in Fortune magazine on August 13, 2001 about his consid-
eration of making a huge donation to Stanford, at the same time 
when the two SLC members were being courted to join the Oracle 
board.71 
 
 66. Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Con-
trol of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1233, 1241–42 (2002). 
 67. See id. at 1233–35. 
 68. Complaint ¶ 7, SEC v. Fastow, No. H-02-3666 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2002), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp17762.htm.  
 69. In re Oracle Co. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 928 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. at 946. 
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The court therefore denied the SLC’s motion to terminate the 
lawsuit. 
It seems unlikely, however, that this caliber and level of 
inquiry would be routinely made. And it is not even clear that 
making such an inquiry on a regular basis would be desirable. 
It would add considerable costs and uncertainty, and it would 
embolden plaintiffs’ lawyers, who have their own conflicts of in-
terest when they represent a corporation’s shareholders.  
One of the most difficult cases involving two competing in-
terests was the government-orchestrated merger of Merrill 
Lynch and Bank of America (BofA) in 2008.72 The deal turned 
out to be a bad one for BofA shareholders,73 and it became clear 
that BofA management may have misrepresented critical facts 
about Merrill’s financial health to its shareholders.74 The 
Treasury Department and other parts of the government were 
eager to get the deal done to stave off further erosion of confi-
dence in the financial system. Treasury officials, including for-
mer Secretary Henry Paulson, apparently exerted exceptional 
pressure on BofA management to close the deal.75 The govern-
ment also may have known that BofA managers were not tell-
 
 72. For a description of the events leading up to and following the merger, 
see Letter from Andrew Cuomo, Attorney Gen., N.Y., to Senator Christopher 
Dodd, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs 2–4 
(Apr. 23, 2009), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ 
BofAmergLetter-Cuomo4232009.pdf. 
 73. See id. at 1–2. 
 74. See id. at 2, 4. 
 75. See id. at 2–4. Attorney General Cuomo’s letter suggests that Secre-
tary Paulson and other government officials threatened to replace BofA’s 
management and its board if BofA backed out of the deal as Merrill’s losses 
mounted, and that BofA management was now claiming that the Treasury 
Department did not want disclosure of the true facts to BofA shareholders. See 
id. at 3. The predicament BofA management was in when they tried to justify 
the deal is apparent in Attorney General Cuomo’s rendition of an interview his 
office had with BofA CEO Ken Lewis: 
Q. Wasn’t Mr. Paulson, by his instruction, really asking Bank of 
America shareholders to take a good part of the hit of the Merrill 
losses?  
A. What he was doing was trying to stem a financial disaster in the 
financial markets, from his perspective.  
Q. From your perspective, wasn’t that one of the effects of what he 
was doing?  
A. Over the short term, yes, but we still thought we had an entity 
that filled two big strategic holes for us and over long term would still 
be an interest to the shareholders.  
Q. What do you mean by “short-term”? 
A. Two to three years. 
Id. at 5.  
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ing their own shareholders the true story, yet for the greater 
good the government may have looked the other way. BofA 
shareholders had a legitimate interest in the value of their in-
vestment, but another legitimate interest—preserving confi-
dence in the financial system by doing something about an in-
solvent Merrill Lynch—apparently dominated both corporate 
and government decisionmaking. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) subsequently brought suit against BofA for 
lying to its shareholders,76 and a $150 million settlement of the 
suit was only grudgingly approved by federal Judge Jed S. Ra-
koff.77 Questions not yet answered are whether the government 
itself was an aider and abetter of this fraud against sharehold-
ers and whether the government allowed this deal to happen 
the way it did because, in this extraordinary circumstance, the 
ends were believed to justify the means.  
Of course, many corporate decisions are not so seriously 
conflicted as to undermine legitimate corporate interests. But 
the foregoing suggests that top decisionmakers at corporations 
sometimes are not in an ideal position to make decisions that 
advance the interests that those decisions are supposed to ad-
vance. Where there is a stark conflict, the law has plausible 
procedures. But people are naturally influenced by many types 
of personal and professional ties. It may be difficult to distin-
guish between decisions that appear to favor illegitimate inter-
ests but in fact favor legitimate interests and decisions that fa-
vor illegitimate interests whether or not they appear to do so. 
The problems are pervasive and do not lend themselves to any 
easy resolution. The law cannot closely scrutinize every board 
action (or inaction). Its general rule is strong deference to the 
board’s business judgment unless there is a clear conflict or a 
showing of bad faith, or in a few other circumscribed fact pat-
terns such as failure to make disclosures required by securities 
laws (as in the BofA case).78 Thus, even if board behavior is 
challenged, in most cases the board will prevail.  
 
 76. Complaint ¶¶ 1–7, SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., Nos. 09 Civ. 6829, 10 
Civ. 0215 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2010). 
 77. See Louise Story, Bank’s Deal with SEC Is Approved, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
23, 2010, at B1, available at 2010 WLNR 3771779 (discussing Judge Rakoff ’s 
displeasure with the settlement of the SEC’s case, which had arisen out of Bo-
fA’s failure to disclose to its shareholders Merrill’s losses and hefty bonus 
payouts that eventually led to a second government bailout of $20 billion).  
 78. See Kaal & Painter, supra note 63, at 1459–61. 
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III.  CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN GOVERNMENT   
Government ethics law contains both broad principles and 
specific rules. The principles include impartiality and other as-
pects of decisionmaker independence. As illustrated in the dis-
cussion that follows, however, the rules do little to eliminate or 
even mitigate the hard cases of conflicts of interest.  
A 1989 Executive Order of President George H.W. Bush set 
forth fourteen principles of ethical conduct for government em-
ployees,79 which were then included in Office of Government 
Ethics (OGE) regulations known as the Standards of Conduct.80 
The standards included a specific provision that government 
employees shall not only avoid violating the standards but also 
endeavor to avoid actions creating an appearance that they are 
violating the law or the standards. This is the fourteenth prin-
ciple set forth in the Executive Order as well as the fourteenth 
standard of conduct set forth in the OGE regulations.81 The 
other thirteen standards are: 
(1) Public service is a public trust, requiring employees to place loyal-
ty to the Constitution, the laws and ethical principles above private 
gain. (2) Employees shall not hold financial interests that conflict 
with the conscientious performance of duty. (3) Employees shall not 
engage in financial transactions using nonpublic Government infor-
mation or allow the improper use of such information to further any 
private interest. (4) An employee shall not, except as permitted by 
subpart B of this part, solicit or accept any gift or other item of mone-
tary value from any person or entity seeking official action from, 
doing business with, or conducting activities regulated by the em-
ployee’s agency, or whose interests may be substantially affected by 
the performance or nonperformance of the employee’s duties. (5) Em-
ployees shall put forth honest effort in the performance of their du-
ties. (6) Employees shall not knowingly make unauthorized commit-
ments or promises of any kind purporting to bind the Government. (7) 
Employees shall not use public office for private gain. (8) Employees 
shall act impartially and not give preferential treatment to any pri-
vate organization or individual. (9) Employees shall protect and con-
serve Federal property and shall not use it for other than authorized 
activities. (10) Employees shall not engage in outside employment or 
activities, including seeking or negotiating for employment, that con-
flict with official Government duties and responsibilities. (11) Em-
ployees shall disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption to appropri-
ate authorities. (12) Employees shall satisfy in good faith their 
obligations as citizens, including all just financial obligations, espe-
 
 79. See Exec. Order No. 12,674, 3 C.F.R. 215 (1990), as modified by Exec. 
Order No. 12,731, 3 C.F.R. 306 (1991) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7301, 7351, 7353 
(2006)). 
 80. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101 (1992). 
 81. See id. 
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cially those—such as Federal, State, or local taxes—that are imposed 
by law. (13) Employees shall adhere to all laws and regulations that 
provide equal opportunity for all Americans regardless of race, color, 
religion, sex, national origin, age, or handicap.82 
Federal ethics regulations seek to implement the standards 
by addressing specific threats to the fiduciary principle—and in 
particular, certain enumerated biases that undermine impar-
tiality. Government ethics law, like corporate law, thus targets 
the specific threats that lawmakers and regulators want to ad-
dress and believe they can address with legal rules. As ex-
plained more fully below, other influences that bias govern-
ment officials’ decisionmaking are not addressed.  
First among the influences that government ethics law 
does address is personal financial conflicts of interest. Govern-
ment ethics law is obsessed with stockholding and other per-
sonal financial interests that could bias public officials; it in-
cludes extensive transparency and accountability rules in this 
area. 
The financial disclosure regime was introduced by the Eth-
ics in Government Act of 197883 and covers all three branches 
of government. Disclosure is intended to increase public confi-
dence in government, demonstrate the integrity of most gov-
ernment officials, deter conflicts of interest, deter persons from 
entering public service if their personal finances cannot with-
stand public scrutiny, and facilitate public assessment of gov-
ernment officials in light of outside financial interests.84 A more 
cynical view is that financial disclosure, along with, perhaps, 
some other aspects of federal ethics regulation, is intended to 
create the appearance of impartiality while the more serious 
conflicts of interest in government go unregulated. 
Form 278 (Public Financial Disclosure) is required of all 
presidential candidates, nominees to presidentially appointed, 
senate-confirmed (PAS) positions in the executive branch, sen-
ior agency employees above the GS-15 level on the Executive 
Schedule, and commissioned officers in the White House.85 The 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, 
amended by Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716. 
 84. See OFFICE OF GOV’T ETHICS, REPORT TO CONGRESS EVALUATING THE 
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE PROCESS FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH, AND RECOMMENDING IMPROVEMENTS TO IT 2 (2005) [hereinafter 
OGE, REPORT TO CONGRESS], available at http://www.usoge.gov/ethics_docs/ 
publications/reports_plans/rpogc_fin_dis_03_05.pdf.  
 85. Employees holding positions not under the General Schedule must file 
if their basic pay is equal to or greater than 120 percent of the minimum rate 
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required disclosures about personal financial holdings are ex-
tensive and include the underlying assets of some investment 
funds.86 A limited number of government officials put their as-
sets in blind trusts, the contents of which are not disclosed, but 
most do not have blind trusts and those officials’ assets are dis-
closed.87 There is some required disclosure of recent private 
sector relationships such as consulting engagements for two 
years prior to and during government service. Form 278 re-
quires disclosure of spousal income and assets, but not the as-
sets, employment, or other private-sector relationships of par-
ents, siblings, grown children, or other family members. Form 
278 also does not include investments and other interest of 
close friends or former business associates. 
A great deal of effort is expended by government officials, 
their lawyers, their agencies, and the OGE to determine what 
does and does not have to be reported on the Form 278 and 
when investments such as hedge funds and private equity 
funds have to be broken out on the form into their component 
 
of basic pay for GS-15 of the General Schedule. See OFFICE OF GOV’T ETHICS, 
PUBLIC FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE: A REVIEWER’S REFERENCE (2008), available at 
http://www.usoge.gov/ethics_docs/publications/reference_publications/rf278guid
e_ 
04.pdf; see also 5 C.F.R. pt. 2634 (2000).  
 86. Form 278 requires for each reporting period—usually the calendar 
year—disclosure for the filer, the filer’s spouse, and minor children of all as-
sets valued over $1000; income from any nonfederal source over $200 (Sched-
ule A); purchases, sales, or exchanges of assets (Schedule B, Part I); gifts re-
ceived over $335 from any single source other than family members during the 
reporting period; and payments of travel expenses in cash or kind (Schedule B, 
Part II). A noticeable exception is that there need be no report on Form 278 or 
anywhere else of political travel reported to the Federal Election Commission. 
Form 278 also requires disclosure of liabilities outstanding during the report-
ing period (Schedule C, Part I); agreements and arrangements with nonfederal 
persons, such as continued participation in an employee benefit plan, contin-
ued payments by a former employer including severance payments, and 
agreements for future employment (Schedule C, Part II); and positions held 
outside the federal government, whether compensated or not, such as officer, 
director, trustee, general partner, employee, or consultant (Schedule D, Part 
I). New employees coming into the federal government are required to disclose 
most of the same information back to the beginning of the prior calendar year. 
New employees are also required to disclose for the prior two years all sources 
of outside income over $5000 annually received from any one source. See 5 
C.F.R. pt. 2634 (2010).  
 87. The underlying assets of a “qualified blind trust” do not have to be re-
ported on Form 278, because public disclosure would defeat the purpose of a 
blind trust. However, rules for blind trusts in the executive branch are very 
strict. The requirements for a qualified blind trust are set forth in 5 C.F.R. 
§ 2634.403.  
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parts.88 For wealthy filers, often political appointees at the 
highest levels of government, Form 278 can be dozens of pages 
long.89 The form reveals almost nothing, however, about these 
persons’ involvement in the system of campaign finance—
donating money and raising money—that may have helped 
them get government appointments in the first place.  
Form 278 filings are publicly available upon request from 
OGE or from the filer’s agency.90 For the most part, if someone 
wants to find out what a senior government official or his or 
her spouse own, this information is publicly available, leading 
to a media feeding frenzy for trivia when the president files his 
form. Given the failure of Form 278 to address many types of 
structural bias, however, this financial information often is not 
very useful for identifying factors that bias government deci-
sionmaking. As explained more fully below, financial assets 
that would be listed on the form and that could cause bias most 
 
 88. All individual investments must be listed separately, including under-
lying holdings of brokerage accounts, trusts, partnerships, and investment 
funds. Only if an investment fund qualifies as an “excepted investment fund” 
(EIF), a term created by Congress, is disclosure of underlying assets in the fund 
not required. The term EIF designates a pooled investment vehicle that meets 
all three of the following requirements: (1) the fund is widely held (a widely 
held fund has more than one hundred investors); (2) the fund is either (a) pub-
licly traded (or available), or (b) widely diversified (a widely diversified fund 
holds no more than five percent of the value of its portfolio in the securities of 
any one issuer other than the U.S. government and no more than twenty per-
cent of the value of its portfolio in any single economic or geographic sector); 
and (3) the fund is independently managed so that the filer does not have the 
ability to exercise control over fund investments. Mutual funds, money-market 
funds, annuities, defined-contribution pension plans, and similar investments 
qualify as EIFs, but some private-equity funds, venture-capital funds, hedge 
funds, and other funds are not EIFs, usually because they are not “widely 
held.” If a fund is not an EIF, each and every separate investment in the fund 
must be identified and listed on Form 278. This has led some filers’ Forms 278 to 
be dozens of pages long, even if they invest in only a few funds that are not EIFs.  
 89. OGE has recommended that Congress simplify the financial disclosure 
regime, and pare back unnecessary details in disclosure. See OGE, REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, supra note 84, at 11–12. So far, Congress has done nothing, per-
haps because doing so would give the appearance of loosening ethics regula-
tions. Meanwhile, as pointed out in this Article, many undisclosed conflicts of 
interest—particularly those involving contributors to political campaigns—go 
unaddressed. 
 90. Form 450 (Confidential Financial Disclosure) is required of other gov-
ernment employees below the senior executive service who have been desig-
nated by their agencies to file the report. The form is retained by agency ethics 
officials, but is not available for public inspection. Form 450 is substantially sim-
ilar to Form 278, but in some areas does not require as detailed a disclosure. 
See Instructions for OGE Form 450 (codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 2634, Subpart I 
(2002)), available at http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/144336main_fr450fill_04-3.pdf. 
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likely will have been sold to comply with financial conflict-of-
interest rules. The remaining factors that could cause bias do 
not appear on the form.  
Accountability rules governing financial conflicts of inter-
est appear to be strict at least insofar as an official’s personal 
financial holdings are concerned. The financial conflict-of-
interest rule is in a criminal statute91 that prohibits any gov-
ernment employee from participating personally and substan-
tially in a particular matter having a direct and predictable ef-
fect on the financial interest of the employee, the employee’s 
spouse or minor child (but not a grown child, parent, or sibling), 
or an organization of which the employee is a director, officer, 
or trustee, or any person or organization with whom the em-
ployee is negotiating for employment. This latter aspect of the 
prohibition, however, is easy to circumvent because it does not 
apply to casual conversations about prospective employment 
and other situations where it is likely that the government offi-
cial working on a matter that affects a company will be offered 
a job in the company or another company in the same industry 
upon leaving government. Specific employers with whom the 
government official is negotiating for employment—usually to-
ward the end of government service—are covered by the prohi-
bition, but the wide range of prospective employers that benefit 
from the official’s decisions are not covered. The official may 
continue to participate personally and substantially in govern-
ment matters that have a direct and predictable impact on 
those employers. 
When private sector officials come into government, ethics 
rules also require relatively little by way of recusal. In general, 
all that has been required is divestment of any financial inter-
est in the former employer and other holdings that create prob-
lems under the conflict-of-interest statute.92 There is also a re-
quirement to recuse oneself for one year from particular 
matters in which the former employer is a party, but this does 
not include matters in which the former employer is not a party 
even if the matter has an effect on the former employer.93 This 
 
 91. 18 U.S.C. § 208 (2006).  
 92. See id. The head of an agency is permitted to waive this prohibition 
after consultation with the OGE. 
 93. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(a) (2010) (requiring recusal from particular 
matters involving specific parties if the government employee has a “covered 
relationship” with one of the parties or with someone who represents a party); 
id. § 2635.502(b)(1)(iv) (defining “covered relationship” to include employers 
for whom the government employee worked within the past year). An agency-
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recusal requirement appears in an OGE regulation that is 
called the “impartiality rule,”94 a label suggesting that it is de-
signed to eliminate or mitigate partiality of government deci-
sionmakers. The rule, however, is extremely narrow in its lim-
ited time duration and its limited scope: it applies only to 
particular party matters in which the former employer is a par-
ty.95 Other matters affecting the former employer or its indus-
try are excluded. The rule also says nothing about executive 
branch officials having to recuse themselves from matters in-
volving persons and companies that contributed to the presi-
dent’s political campaign or political party. Even if the official 
met such persons at a political fundraiser and discussed official 
government business with them at the fundraiser, the impar-
tiality rule does not require recusal. In sum, many, if not most, 
sources of conflicts of interest are excluded from the impartiali-
ty rule, and the rule thus does relatively little to assure that 
government officials are impartial.  
President Obama’s Executive Order of January 21, 200996 
imposed more stringent requirements on incoming government 
officials, perhaps mitigating some of the harder to address con-
flicts of interest, but not by much. Among other things, Presi-
dent Obama’s order requires incoming administration appoint-
ees97 to sign a pledge that they will not work on particular 
matters involving specific parties, including regulations and 
contracts that are “directly and substantially” related to their 
former employers or former clients for a period of two years af-
ter they enter the administration.98 Incoming appointees who 
 
designated ethics official can grant an authorization for an agency employee to 
participate in such a matter if the need for the official to participate outweighs 
the appearance of impropriety. See id. § 2635.502(d). This rule does not cover 
matters, such as regulation of an entire industry, that do not have specific 
identifiable parties. 
 94. Id. § 2635.502. 
 95. See id. § 2635.502(a) (covering “a particular matter involving specific 
parties”). 
 96. Exec. Order No. 13,490, 74 Fed. Reg. 4673 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
 97. See id. § 2(b) (“‘Appointee’ shall include every full-time, non-career 
Presidential or Vice-Presidential appointee, non-career appointee in the Senior 
Executive Service (or other SES-type system), and appointee to a position that 
has been excepted from the competitive service by reason of being of a confi-
dential or policymaking character (Schedule C and other positions excepted 
under comparable criteria) in an executive agency. It does not include any per-
son appointed as a member of the Senior Foreign Service or solely as a uni-
formed service commissioned officer.”). 
 98. See id. § 1 (“2. Revolving Door Ban—All Appointees Entering Gov-
ernment. I will not for a period of 2 years from the date of my appointment 
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are registered lobbyists are bound by stricter rules.99 A close 
reading of the order, however, reveals that for the most part it 
only applies to a narrow range of matters—once again, particu-
lar party matters—and that most sources of structural bias re-
main untouched. 
The revolving door out of government is more strictly regu-
lated than the revolving door into government, but here also 
the regulation is narrow in scope. After leaving government, an 
official is subject to one or more bans on “representing back” to 
the government.100 Former government employees at all levels 
are prohibited from representing back to the government on 
behalf of another person with respect to the same particular 
matters involving specific parties that they participated in per-
sonally and substantially while in government service.101 This 
rule would cover, for example, an investigation of a particular 
company or a particular government contract. This ban does 
not apply to the majority of government business such as poli-
cymaking or regulation of particular industries.102 “Senior em-
ployees”103 in the executive branch are subject to a one-year 
 
participate in any particular matter involving specific parties that is directly 
and substantially related to my former employer or former clients, including 
regulations and contracts.”). 
 99. See id. (prohibiting appointees who were registered lobbyists within 
two years of their appointment from “participat[ing] in any particular matter 
on which [they] lobbied,” “participating in the specific issue area in which that 
particular matter falls,” or “seek[ing] or accept[ing] employment with any ex-
ecutive agency [they] lobbied”). 
 100. 18 U.S.C. § 207 (2006). 
 101. Id. § 207(a)(1)(C). 
 102. One problem with § 207(a) is its ambiguity. What constitutes “person-
al[ ] and substantial[ ]” participation while in government service? Id. 
§ 207(a)(1)(B). What constitutes a “particular matter” “involv[ing] specific par-
ties”? Id. § 207(a)(1)(C). When are two matters, such as two federal contracts 
that are part of a single umbrella contract or contracting program, separate 
“particular matter[s] . . . which involv[e] specific parties,” id. § 207(a)(1), and 
when are they a single matter so a former employee who worked on one is 
barred from representing back to the government with respect to them all? 
Can two previously separate matters later converge into a single particular 
matter involving specific parties? OGE has sought to clarify some of these is-
sues in new rules interpreting § 207(a) that were proposed in 2003, and then 
revised and issued as final rules in June 2008. See Post-Employment Conflict 
of Interest Restrictions, 73 Fed. Reg. 36,168, 36,168 (June 25, 2008) (to be cod-
ified at 5 C.F.R. pts. 2637, 2641). 
 103. See 18 U.S.C. § 207(c)(2) (defining “senior” government employees 
based on pay grade). The pay threshold was $143,953 for 2008. See Memoran-
dum from Don W. Fox, Gen. Counsel, Office of Gov’t Ethics, to Designated 
Agency Ethics Officials 3 (Nov. 6, 2008), available at http://www.usoge.gov/ 
ethics_guidance/daeograms/dgr_files/2008/do08037.pdf. Certain other employees 
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“cooling off period” during which they may not represent back 
on behalf of other persons or companies to any department or 
agency in which they previously served.104 This includes face-
to-face contact, phone calls, email, or any other communica-
tions made to agency officials with intent to influence official 
actions. “Very senior”105 employees, such as cabinet officers and 
assistants to the president in the White House, are required to 
defer representing back not only to the agencies or entities 
where they served, but also to other senior or very senior em-
ployees anywhere in the executive branch.106 Section 101 of the 
2007 Honest Leadership and Open Government Act107 extends 
from one year to two years this “cooling off period” for former 
very senior employees. 
Once again, these rules do little to combat the conflicts of 
interest of government officials who may be predisposed to fa-
vor persons in the private sector who used to be their col-
leagues in government. The generally-applicable particular-
party-matter ban is very narrow and is easy to circumvent by 
keeping communications to one’s former agency on a general 
level. Thus, it is permitted to say that “the SEC needs to ease 
up on its aggressive pursuit of alleged wrongdoing in the finan-
cial industry; the SEC was way too aggressive when I was 
there and you are still being too aggressive now.” Yet, it is pro-
hibited to state that “I worked on the SEC investigation of 
Company X and now that I work for Company X, I think the 
SEC should abandon the investigation of Company X.” Is there 
really a difference between the two? The additional post-
employment bans on former senior and very senior employees 
representing back to the government are of relatively short du-
ration, and once again they exclude social contact and other in-
direct ways of influencing government decisionmaking. 
President Obama has sought to tighten up ethics rules in 
this area also. His January 2009 Executive Order requires sen-
ior officials in his administration to agree to a two-year post-
employment ban on representing back to their former agen-
 
who may earn less than this amount, including Deputy Assistants to the Pres-
ident, also fall into this category. 
 104. 18 U.S.C. § 207(c). 
 105. See id. § 207(d) (defining “very senior” government employees). This 
category includes, among others, agency heads and Assistants to the President 
in the White House. See id.  
 106. See id. § 207(d)(2). 
 107. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act, tit. 1, § 101(a), Pub. L. 
No. 110-81, 121 Stat. 735, 736–77 (2007) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 207(d)(1)). 
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cy,108 and requires that administration officials who leave to 
lobby agree not to lobby the administration at all for the entire 
time he is president.109 President Obama’s order, however, is 
difficult to enforce against persons who have left the govern-
ment.110 Unlike the statutory prohibition, it is not a criminal 
statute. The order also does not ban social contact, and in par-
ticular, it does not ban contact with former government col-
leagues at political fundraisers and other events. 
A brief look at all of these rules and their shortcomings 
shows how difficult it is for existing regulation—and probably 
any regulation—to mitigate the corrupting influence from pri-
vate employment either before or after government service. 
Ethics rules purport to accomplish a great deal, but actually 
may prohibit relatively little. The problem of government offi-
cials’ bias toward private sector employers past and future re-
mains, as does the problem of bias toward the opinions of for-
mer government colleagues who have departed for the private 
sector.  
The problem of unresolved conflicts of interest—or at least 
the appearance of a problem in the eyes of many outside ob-
servers—is illustrated most clearly by the political controversy 
surrounding movement of high-ranking officials from one par-
ticular Wall Street firm to and from government, a phenome-
non sometimes referred to as “Government Sachs.”111 Two re-
cent treasury secretaries, Robert Rubin and Henry Paulson, 
came directly from Goldman Sachs. Many observers, including 
some of Goldman’s competitors on Wall Street, have com-
plained that because of these government connections Goldman 
Sachs has an unfair advantage.112 These complaints are not 
about violations of ethics rules per se; the evidence thus far 
 
 108. Exec. Order No. 13,490, 74 Fed. Reg. 4673 (Jan. 21, 2009) (“4. Revolv-
ing Door Ban—Appointees Leaving Government. If, upon my departure from 
the Government, I am covered by the post-employment restrictions on com-
municating with employees of my former executive agency set forth in section 
207(c) of title 18, United States Code, I agree that I will abide by those restric-
tions for a period of 2 years following the end of my appointment.”). 
 109. See id. (“5. Revolving Door Ban—Appointees Leaving Government to 
Lobby. In addition to abiding by the limitations of paragraph 4, I also agree, 
upon leaving Government service, not to lobby any covered executive branch 
official or non-career Senior Executive Service appointee for the remainder of 
the Administration.”). 
 110. See 18 U.S.C. § 207. 
 111. See, e.g., Julie Creswell & Ben White, The Guys from “Government 
Sachs”, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at BU1, available at 2008 WLNR 19879549. 
 112. See id. 
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suggests that few if any ethics rules were violated. These com-
plaints are about the hard cases of conflicts of interest that eth-
ics rules do not reach. 
For both Rubin and Paulson, financial conflicts of interest 
were addressed by requiring the incoming Secretary of the 
Treasury, and anyone else coming in with him, to sell their fi-
nancial interest in Goldman or any other financial services 
firm.113 Once the incoming secretary and his subordinates sold 
their interest in Goldman, it was presumed that there would be 
no conflict of interest because their financial holdings were no 
longer influenced by the fortunes of Goldman. The secretary 
was free to participate in particular government matters that 
had a direct and predictable impact on Goldman.114 It did not 
matter that the secretary had spent much of his professional 
life and made almost his entire fortune at Goldman. It did not 
matter that many of the secretary’s closest business associates 
were still at Goldman and that he was indebted to them for his 
professional success as well as his financial success. The con-
flict of interest specifically identified in the statute—the equity 
stake in Goldman—had been eliminated. Psychological factors 
and other factors that could continue to foster favoritism ap-
parently could not be dealt with through regulation. 
During Secretary Rubin’s term in office the issue came up 
several times. In 1995, the U.S. government participated in a 
bailout of Mexico, a country in which Goldman had invested 
heavily.115 Rubin arguably had a conflict of interest under the 
analysis we propose here—but not under the conflict-of-interest 
analysis in the statute.116 In 1998 came the Asian currency 
bailout. Once again, Goldman was one of several banks with 
substantial exposure in Asia. Rubin was allowed to participate 
in these bailouts because he had divested completely from 
Goldman when he became Secretary of the Treasury.117 From 
the vantage point of government ethics rules, that was enough. 
Rubin’s reign during the 1990s was also a period of sub-
stantial deregulation in the banking industry coinciding with 
the rapid development of new financial products such as more 
 
 113. Gretchen Morgenson & Don Van Natta, Jr., Paulson’s Calls to Gold-
man Tested Ethics During Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, at A1, available at 
2009 WLNR 15396094. 
 114. See Creswell & White, supra note 111, at BU1. 
 115. See Painter, supra note 4, at 141. 
 116. 18 U.S.C. § 208 (2006). 
 117. See Painter, supra note 4, at 141. 
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exotic forms of mortgage-backed securities and collateralized 
debt obligations. Goldman Sachs benefited from both deregula-
tion of its existing business and from innovation in new lines of 
business free of new regulation. Secretary Rubin was often on 
the side of deregulation and was often reluctant to regulate 
new financial products, meaning a Democratic administration 
put up relatively little resistance to the deregulatory agenda of 
a Republican Congress. Once again, nothing in conflict-of-
interest statutes or the Standards of Conduct for Federal Em-
ployees prohibited Secretary Rubin from participating in these 
decisions, or sometimes leading the charge against persons in 
the Clinton administration who pressed for more regulation. 
Any structural bias he might have had toward Goldman—or 
Citibank, his future employer once he left Treasury—cannot be 
demonstrated conclusively, and what types of favoritism were 
involved (conscious bias, unconscious bias, both, or none) is not 
clear. Still, for persons dissatisfied with the aftermath of the 
deregulatory era of the 1990s, there is lingering concern that 
Secretary Rubin and other Treasury officials from Wall Street 
may have favored Wall Street at the expense of the rest of the 
country.118 
The next Treasury secretary from Goldman Sachs, Henry 
Paulson, was instrumental in the bailouts of 2008 and 2009. 
Goldman was not directly a party to bailouts, but gained from 
bailouts given to other banks such as AIG, which owed Gold-
man $20 billion as a counterparty in derivative contracts: al-
though Goldman had insured a portion of its AIG exposure, its 
insurance counterparties might not have been able to pay. 
Goldman also may have benefited when a bailout was denied to 
long-standing rival Lehman Brothers. 
Secretary Paulson was allowed to participate in these bail-
outs. He had sold off his interest in Goldman Sachs, and that 
was all that was required.119 He had even gone beyond what 
 
 118. It should be noted that Secretary Rubin’s successor, Lawrence Sum-
mers, came from academia, not Wall Street. In many areas he shared Secre-
tary Rubin’s deregulatory views. Not all persons who enter government from 
Wall Street firms will have structural bias; not all persons from outside Wall 
Street will lack structural bias. That being said, structural bias can influence 
government officials’ decisionmaking, including decisions about the selection 
of one’s deputy and likely successor. Academics also are subject to their own 
structural biases—particularly a tendency to gravitate toward prevailing 
views of other academics—that are beyond the scope of this Article.  
119. See Painter, supra note 4, at 141–43. The conflict of interest statute, 
18 U.S.C. § 208, does not prohibit a government official’s participation in a 
matter affecting a former employer if the official resigns his position with the 
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was required and agreed not to participate in particular mat-
ters in which Goldman Sachs was a party or represented a par-
ty for his entire term in office120 (a dispute later arose over 
whether he had fully complied with this agreement when he 
met with Goldman officials in the fall of 2008).121  
Given the time constraints, Secretary Paulson and his col-
leagues had limited room to maneuver and little time to make 
decisions. Treasury Department lawyers could not disable the 
secretary or his staff simply because the department went into 
the crisis with senior ranks top heavy with former employees of 
Goldman and other investment banks. Federal ethics regula-
tions did not address the hard cases of conflict of interest. In a 
time of crisis, the government and the public had to live with 
them.122 
It has not been established thus far that there was any 
specific improper influence from Goldman or any other bank on 
former employees in the government. Nonetheless, many ob-
servers have speculated about the Treasury Department’s mo-
tives in various bailout decisions. Similarly questioned is the 
decision not to intervene in the deteriorating market for mort-
gage-backed securities in 2007 and early 2008, government in-
action which gave Goldman and some other banks time to un-
 
former employer, does not engage in negotiations with respect to future em-
ployment, and retains no financial interest in the former employer. 
 120. See Letter from Henry Paulson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, to 
John P. Schorn, Deputy Assistant Gen. Counsel and Designated Agency Ethics 
Official, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury (June 19, 2006), available at http://devel 
.philstockworld.com/2009/08/11/the-paulson-ethics-waiver (“As a prudential 
matter I will not participate in any particular matter involving specific parties 
in which the Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (Goldman Sachs) is or represents a 
party for the duration of my tenure as Secretary of the Treasury unless my 
participation is in accordance with 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(d).”). 
 121. See Morgenson & Van Natta, supra note 113, at A1. Paulson also was 
given an ethics waiver by the White House and another waiver by Treasury 
Department ethics lawyers so he could participate in matters affecting Goldman. 
 122. Controversy over Goldman’s influence has lasted beyond the depar-
ture of Secretary Paulson. Stephen Friedman, a former chairman of Goldman, 
served as a senior economic advisor under President George W. Bush. He then 
went back into the private sector and served on Goldman’s board of directors 
while serving the administration as a special government employee (SGE) in a 
variety of capacities, and then continued to serve during the Obama adminis-
tration as a director of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Friedman also 
allegedly purchased Goldman stock in December 2008 and January 2009. See 
Jon Hilsenrath & Kate Kelly, Chairman of New York Fed Quits Amidst Ques-
tions, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2009, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB124173340275898051.html. Friedman resigned his Fed post in May 
2009, presumably because of the conflict. See id.  
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load their holdings and/or hedge their bets. From an appear-
ances perspective, it may not have been enough to require 
Treasury officials coming in from Goldman or other investment 
banks to dispose of their stock and stock options when they re-
tained close ties to their former employers. From the vantage 
point of many observers, structural bias remained intact. 
Yet another source of conflicts of interest in government is 
from the political process by which government is chosen. For 
better or worse, government is about politics and politics 
creates structural bias in favor of political supporters, potential 
political supporters, and, of course, political contributors. 
Commentary from the perspective of public choice theory ana-
lyzes how political factors play out when economic resources 
are allocated by government instead of by markets.123 Looking 
at a recent example, it should not be surprising that when the 
auto companies were bailed out in 2009, a Democratic adminis-
tration that owed its election in part to labor unions would fa-
vor labor union creditors over other creditors of the auto com-
panies in its bailout plan. A pro-labor bias appears to have been 
present, although it is not clear how much this bias steered 
government decisionmaking away from the fiduciary principle. 
The voters may have elected President Obama because he 
would favor labor interests over bank creditors; alternatively, 
the voters may not have had any such intention. The combina-
tion of structural bias and politics is thus difficult to untangle, 
and the impact of political structural bias on the fiduciary prin-
ciple is sometimes uncertain. Political structural bias is, how-
ever, persistently present in government, and at times it can 
steer government officials away from their fiduciary obligations 
to the public. 
Political operatives have varying degrees of access to gov-
ernment officials. Political operatives have more access and 
more influence when government officials participate in per-
sonal capacity partisan political activity. Until it was closed 
down by President Obama in 2011, the White House Office of 
Political Affairs (OPA) had a critical role in organizing this ac-
tivity.124 OPA staff members moonlighted in their personal ca-
 
 123. See generally FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: 
POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 1 (1997) 
(“[L]egislation and regulation are sold to the highest bidder in political mar-
kets, just as other goods and services are sold in more familiar commercial 
markets.”).  
 124. See Richard W. Painter, The Separation of Politics and State, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 14, 2010, at A23, available at 2010 WLNR 12057868. 
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pacity for the president’s political party—among other things, 
speaking at campaign events, coordinating strategy with can-
didates, and facilitating political work by other administration 
officials. OPA officials also recruited political appointees in the 
agencies, including sometimes cabinet members and their dep-
uties, to speak at political events and perform other duties for 
the party.125 When political appointees in government partici-
pate in partisan political activity and then make decisions that 
affect private interests, it should not be surprising that these 
decisions are influenced by private interests that are also en-
gaged in partisan politics. Curtailing political activity of high-
ranking executive branch officials, including those in the White 
 
 125. The Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–7326 (2006), prohibits partisan polit-
ical activity by government employees while on duty, in government buildings, 
using official titles, or at government expense. See id. There is, however, an 
exception in the regulations that allows some senior political appointees to 
conduct personal capacity partisan political activity in government buildings 
during normal working hours. Official titles still cannot be used, nor can gov-
ernment expense be incurred (separate communications equipment is usually 
provided for these officials by the RNC or the DNC). One of the authors of this 
Article has criticized this exception and called for closure of the White House 
Office of Political Affairs (OPA), which orchestrates much of this activity. See 
PAINTER, supra note 24, at 245–53; Painter, supra note 124, at A23.  
In January 2011 the Office of Special Counsel issued a report finding 
Hatch Act violations in the Bush White House during the 2006 election cycle. 
See OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, INVESTIGATION OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES BY 
WHITE HOUSE AND FEDERAL AGENCY OFFICIALS DURING THE 2006 MIDTERM 
ELECTIONS (January 2011), available at http://www.osc.gov/documents/hatchact/ 
STF%20Report%20Final.pdf. The Report narrowly construed the exception, 
allowing political activity in government buildings during normal working 
hours, and also emphasized the practical difficulties officials have complying 
with the Hatch Act when performing political and official work at or about the 
same time. See id. at 68 (“‘[C]oncurrent political and official roles put people in 
a position that is difficult and arguably untenable. Critics will blame OPA 
staff members and other officials who engage in political activity for poor ethi-
cal judgment when problems arise. These problems, however, may be inevita-
ble if government officials continue to be asked to perform official and political 
roles concurrently. The public image of the White House and the rest of the 
government will suffer as a consequence.’” (quoting PAINTER, supra note 24, at 
252)); id. at 72 (quoting PAINTER, supra note 24, at 249, on the difficulties gov-
ernment ethics lawyers have giving Hatch Act advice in this context); id. at 75 
(quoting PAINTER, supra note 24, at 249, on the role of the OPA in recruiting 
other administration officials to engage in partisan political activity and on 
the observation that the OPA is “not a necessary or even desirable component” 
of the White House). 
A few days before this Office of Special Counsel Report was issued, Presi-
dent Obama ordered that the OPA be closed and that his political operations 
be moved outside the government to Chicago. See Jeff Zeleny, Obama Will 
Move Political Operations to Chicago, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011, at A27, 
available at 2011 WLNR 1263918. 
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House other than the president and vice president, would alle-
viate this form of favoritism.126 So far, however, this has not 
happened, although President Obama has perhaps reduced the 
direct influence of partisan politics in the White House by clos-
ing OPA and moving his campaign operations to Chicago.  
Campaign contributions are the most notorious form of po-
litical influence, and probably create the worst form of favorit-
ism in government. Contributors get access to government offi-
cials at political fundraisers and in other ways. Government 
officials may not solicit campaign contributions, but they may 
give personal-capacity speeches at fundraisers, and these 
speeches usually are about government business. At these 
events, contributors who want preferential treatment for cer-
tain constituencies—such as large investment banks—make 
their views known.127  
Thus far, the law has been ineffective at dealing with the 
problem of undue political influence of the persons and compa-
nies that pay for elections. Some money is contributed directly 
to political campaigns and most of those contributions are dis-
closed and regulated. The problem is that yet more money is 
contributed to off-balance-sheet transactions implemented 
through 527s and other organizations that support political 
campaigns while evading much of the Federal Election Com-
mission reporting system.128 It would be naive to assume that 
this money does not have a direct influence on members of 
Congress, the president and vice president, or their staffs.  
Banks and other financial services firms spend an enor-
mous amount of money on political campaigns. According to the 
Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), financial services, insur-
ance, and real estate firms have spent $60,913,366 on Political 
Action Committee (PAC) contributions to federal candidates in 
the 2010 election cycle, almost evenly split between Democrats 
and Republicans.129 These firms had spent $62,607,881 on PAC 
contributions in the 2008 election cycle, once again almost 
 
 126. See Painter, supra note 124, at A23. 
 127. See Painter, supra note 4, at 139. 
 128. See PAINTER, supra note 24, at 207–43 (discussing 527s and other ve-
hicles of campaign finance). Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code defines 
the tax status of organizations that seek to influence federal elections, includ-
ing political parties and political action committees (PACs). See 26 I.R.C. § 527 
(2006). 
 129. Finance, Insurance & Real Estate PAC Contributions to Federal Can-
didates, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/sector.php?txt= 
F01&cycle=2010 (last visited Apr. 13, 2011) (2010 cycle). 
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evenly split between the two parties.130 They spent $58,544,271 
on PAC contributions in 2006, almost two thirds on Republi-
cans who controlled Congress and the White House at the 
time.131 This compares with lawyers and lobbyists who are re-
ported to have spent $15,520,896 on PAC contributions in the 
2010 election cycle, and who spent $16,618,130 on PAC contri-
butions in 2008.132 Even the defense industry was comparative-
ly modest in its spending compared with real estate and finan-
cial services firms. Defense firms spent $14,075,964 on PAC 
contributions to federal candidates in the 2010 election cycle, 
and they spent $11,872,992 in the 2008 election cycle.133 In ad-
dition to direct contributions to federal candidates and the na-
tional parties, many financial services firms also spend money 
on their own to influence elections through “independent ex-
penditures.”134 The election of 2004 saw an enormous upswing 
in independent expenditures on issue ads and other attempts to 
sway voters. CRP reports about $270 million in total independ-
ent expenditures in 2004 and 2006 (there is no industry break 
down) and over $300 million in 2008.135 
The Supreme Court last year opened the floodgates yet 
wider. Congress had tried to curtail political spending by corpo-
rations and other special interests in the 2002 McCain-Feingold 
Act, but the Court ruled in 2010 that a critical part of this Act 
was unconstitutional.136 The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 in Citi-
 
 130. Finance, Insurance & Real Estate PAC Contributions to Federal Can-
didates, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/sector.php?cycle= 
2008&txt=F01 (last visited Apr. 13, 2011) (2008 cycle). 
 131. Finance, Insurance & Real Estate PAC Contributions to Federal Can-
didates, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/sector.php?cycle= 
2006&txt=F01 (last visited Apr. 13, 2011) (2006 cycle). 
 132. Lawyers and Lobbyists PAC Contributions to Federal Candidates, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/sector.php?cycle=2010& 
txt=K01 (last visited Apr. 13, 2011). 
 133. Defense, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/sector 
.php?cycle=2010&txt=D01 (last visited Apr. 13, 2011). 
 134. The McCain-Feingold Act defines “independent expenditure” as  
an expenditure by a person (A) expressly advocating the election or 
defeat of a clearly identified candidate; and (B) that is not made in 
concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such 
candidate, the candidate’s authorized political committee, or their 
agents, or a political party committee or its agents. 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, tit. II, subtitle B, Pub. L. No. 107-
155, 116 Stat. 81, 92–93. 
 135. Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
outsidespending/index.php (last visited Apr. 13, 2011). 
 136. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
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zens United v. FEC that corporations could use their treasuries 
to pay for independent political broadcasts in candidate elec-
tions, and that these broadcasts could not be regulated because 
they were protected speech under the First Amendment.137 The 
case concerned a film that was critical of Hillary Clinton adver-
tised in broadcast ads featuring Clinton’s image.138 The Court 
held that the McCain-Feingold Act could not regulate the 
broadcasts because they were protected speech.139 
Curiously, the Court premised its holding on the observa-
tion that corporations have free speech rights similar to those 
of individuals.140 The Court adopted this premise even though 
corporations are not people. Corporations are run by people, 
but limited liability means that the people who run corpora-
tions do not have to accept responsibility when the corporations 
fail. In the latest round of bailouts, the government, not the 
people who ran the corporations, accepted responsibility for 
failure. Nonetheless, the Court has bestowed on corporate 
speech all of the First Amendment protections of individual 
speech, including a right to use corporate money to influence 
government. Unlimited influence coupled with limited liability 
is a curious combination—but the Court has enshrined it in the 
Constitution. 
Money always has flowed steadily from the financial ser-
vices industry into federal elections. After Citizens United, that 
steady flow will likely become a flood. President Obama has 
asked Congress for legislation that would at least make corpo-
rate campaign spending more transparent, but so far Congress 
has not addressed the issue.  
Government thus will continue to have a strong bias in fa-
vor of the people and organizations that pay for the way we 
choose our government. Executive branch officials who do not 
themselves run for office identify with the people, companies, 
trade associations and others that support the president. These 
contributors know they have friends throughout the executive 
branch and in Congress as well. They know about this bias, 
they know how to buy it, and they know how to use it. 
 
 137. Id. at 979. 
 138. Id. at 887. 
 139. Id. at 886. 
 140. See id. at 897. 
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IV.  SOME EXAMPLES: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST WHEN 
GOVERNMENT IS INVOLVED IN MANAGING BUSINESS   
History provides many examples of debacles when govern-
ment has been involved in business. Some of the most serious 
have resulted from easy-case conflicts of interest—the type that 
laws can effectively regulate—coexisting with hard-case con-
flicts of interest. Conflicts of interest are an important reason 
why business managers and government officials acted the way 
they did, and the hard case conflicts are not easy for the law to 
address. 
One type of government involvement in business is gov-
ernment sponsorship. An example is England’s South Sea 
Company, which in 1711 was chartered by Tory politicians and 
their cronies.141 Parliament gave the company a monopoly on 
trade in the South Seas, while a competitor company with Whig 
roots received considerably less favorable treatment.142 Osten-
sibly a trading enterprise, the company was quickly converted 
into an investment bank for refinancing large quantities of gov-
ernment debt England had from its wars with Spain.143 The 
South Sea Company promoters’ scheme presumably was bene-
ficial to the public purse, to the promoters themselves, and to 
investors who were making money from the company’s ever-
increasing stock price, a typical case of mixed motives. This 
government-sponsored enterprise was a win-win situation for 
everybody—for a while.144  
Easy-case conflicts of interest arose when members of Par-
liament (MPs) were given free stock in the company and began 
trading in the stock.145 Even the King’s mistress—but appar-
ently not the Queen—had a stake in the company.146  
When the South Sea Company stock crashed in 1720, many 
people were left in financial ruin.147 A few of the promoters 
were sent to the Tower of London, and many others lost all of 
 
 141. See Richard W. Painter, Ethics and Corruption in Business and Gov-
ernment: Lessons from the South Sea Bubble and the Bank of the United States 
4 (Minn. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-32, 2006), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=920912. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. at 4–5 (“[T]he Company agreed to assume a significant portion 
. . . of floating army and navy debt at a rate of 6% per year.”). 
 144. See id. at 5–6 (discussing the various problems the company encount-
ered—bribery, deception, self-dealing, and poor trade).  
 145. See id. at 6. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See id. at 8. 
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their property. Parliament quickly covered its own tracks by 
passing the Bubble Act of 1720, which forbade publicly traded 
limited liability company interests without a specific grant of 
authority from Parliament.148 Ironically, it was just such a par-
liamentary grant of authority to the South Sea Company that 
had created the problem in the first place, but this did not seem 
to matter.149  
Many different motives—and many different conflicts of in-
terest, some easy and some hard—converge in this story. MPs 
who owed South Sea stock had an incentive to approve the 
company’s plan for refinancing government debt. Indeed, the 
company gave many members their shares, presumably to mo-
tivate them to favor the company’s interests. The government—
and the politicians who ran the government—also stood to ben-
efit from the company’s plan. Moreover, the company’s promo-
ters were close friends of the Tories who controlled Parliament. 
Combined, these conflicts of interest led Parliament to sponsor 
a company that brought England to economic disaster. 
Some aspects of this problem—for example, the personal 
financial holdings of MPs and Treasury officials—are regulated 
today by prohibitions on financial conflicts of interest for gov-
ernment officials, as well as disclosure of their financial hold-
ings. Even this aspect of the problem, however, is not so easily 
separable from the more difficult conflicts of interest that arise 
out of personal friendships and mixed motives. While a compa-
ny today could not give free stock to legislators and Treasury 
officials, it could still buy their favor by paying for political 
campaigns. The end result is the same. Then, as now, the influ-
ence of money on politics is extremely difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to eliminate.  
In the early years of the United States, conflicts of interest 
severely compromised two efforts to establish a government-
sponsored national bank. The first of these was Alexander 
Hamilton’s Bank of the United States.150 The Bank was a pri-
vate bank with a government charter and special privileges; it 
was used to finance the national debt and the individual states’ 
 
 148. See Painter, supra note 141, at 7 (“The Act prohibited formation of 
joint stock companies or other partnerships with freely transferable shares. 
. . . The Bubble Act thus proclaimed that there shall be no bubbles but those 
bubbles officially sanctioned by Parliament.”). 
 149. See id. at 8. 
 150. See id. at 13. 
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debt from the Revolutionary War.151 Hamilton, the first Treas-
ury Secretary, decided to push through Congress a plan to pay 
off that debt for one hundred cents on the dollar.152 Many of the 
beneficiaries, however, were not the original holders of that 
debt—farmers and war veterans—but instead were speculators 
who had purchased the notes at twenty to thirty percent of par 
on advance notice of Hamilton’s plan to pay them off at one 
hundred percent of par.153 Many of these speculators were 
closely tied to Hamilton’s Federalist political party.154 Hamilton 
himself apparently did not buy the notes, but his friends, mem-
bers of Congress, and their friends, did.155  
Congress passed Hamilton’s bill.156 Mixed motives existed 
here also. Hamilton had a powerful argument that honoring 
the debt was crucial to the credit of the United States. The 
plan, however, also benefited many of his political allies and 
some members of Congress who had bought the notes. Some of 
the conflicts of interest would have been easier to regulate—the 
members’ own purchases of the notes would today be consid-
ered illegal insider trading. Other conflicts of interest—such as 
politicians taking care of their “friends”—were far more diffi-
cult to regulate. 
Hamilton’s bank, in any event, was short-lived. Thomas 
Jefferson hated the bank and undermined it as president.157 
Twenty years after its founding, its charter was allowed to ex-
pire.158 The controversy over insider dealing in the government 
notes was one of the reasons the bank fell out of popular fa-
vor.159 
A second Bank of the United States was founded after the 
War of 1812 when once again the government sought out a ve-
hicle for financing its debt.160 Its president, Nicholas Biddle, 
confronted hostility to the bank from Jacksonian Democrats 
and chose to deal with the problem by retaining several mem-
 
 151. See id. at 11, 13. 
 152. See id. at 11 (“Alexander Hamilton . . . wanted an economic system 
that would include . . . payment in full of obligations including public debt.”). 
 153. See id.  
 154. See id. at 12 (“How much Hamilton and his associates leaked inside 
information to friends who in turn traded is still a subject of debate.”). 
 155. See id. at 13. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. at 14. 
 158. See id. 
 159. See id.  
 160. See id. at 14–15. 
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bers of Congress as lawyers and consultants for the Bank.161 
One of these was Senator Daniel Webster of Massachusetts.162 
Some of Senator Webster’s constituents were wealthy Boston 
merchants who were also predisposed to favor a strong banking 
system.163 They also helped support Webster financially.164  
In the end, President Andrew Jackson was successful in 
his effort to abolish the bank.165 Once again, corruption played 
a part in the bank’s demise.166 The retainers Biddle had paid to 
members of Congress were widely known and cast the bank 
and its supporters, in general, in an unfavorable light.167 
These were easy-case conflicts of interest—the direct re-
tainers and other payments that today would probably be char-
acterized as illegal bribes and, in any event, would violate bans 
on outside earned income for members of Congress. Nonethe-
less, it is difficult to distinguish these payments conceptually 
from the campaign contributions that financial services firms 
and other interested parties provide to members of Congress 
today.168 Another complicating factor was decisionmakers’ 
mixed motives. Wealthy merchants, who also showered favors 
upon members of Congress, tended to support the bank; the 
Whig political philosophy of Webster, and many other members 
of Congress, favored a strong financial system. At the same 
time, the Jacksonian Democrats disliked these political consti-
tuencies as well as the bank and were philosophically predis-
posed to oppose the bank.169 Members of Congress from both 
political parties thus were motivated in part by what they be-
lieved was right, and in part by other, less principled reasons. 
Legitimate and corrupt influences on government decisionmak-
ing were in many ways inextricably linked.  
 
 161. See id. at 15–16. 
 162. See id. 
 163. See Robert Gordon, The Devil and Daniel Webster, 94 YALE L.J. 445, 
456 (1984) (noting that Webster had Boston merchant constituents whose in-
terests were often aligned with his own). 
 164. See Painter, supra note 141, at 16 n.46. 
 165. See id. at 17. 
 166. See id. (“The Bank’s corruption of Congress also helped give Jackson 
the moral upper hand.”). 
 167. See id. 
 168. See supra text accompanying notes 129–31 (discussing campaign con-
tributions from the financial services industry in the 2004, 2006, 2008, and 
2010 election cycles). 
 169. See Painter, supra note 141, at 16–17 (noting President Jackson’s ob-
jections to the bank). 
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The payments to members of Congress can be condemned 
as easy cases of conflicts of interest: they constitute 
straightforward corruption that is arguably easy to identify and 
prohibit. The payments, however, might have been necessary to 
assure the bank’s very existence, and in the end they were not 
enough. Congress had set up a bank that was dependent upon 
Congress for renewal of its charter every twenty years, putting 
the bank and its officers in a position of dependency on the gov-
ernment. The bank’s officers apparently thought that they had 
no choice but to corrupt the government upon which they de-
pended. In the end, the conflicts of interest inherent in this ar-
rangement brought discredit to both the bank and to Congress. 
It took until 1913, over two centuries after establishment of the 
Bank of England in 1694, but Congress finally established a 
central bank for the United States that did not have private 
stockholders and did not need to obtain regular renewal of its 
charter from Congress: the Federal Reserve Bank.  
More recently, government notoriously and catastrophical-
ly has been involved in the business of housing finance with 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, both government-sponsored en-
terprises (GSEs). These entities became for-profit corporations 
with shareholders in 1968 (Fannie Mae)170 and 1970 (Freddie 
Mac).171 Notwithstanding their status as GSEs, both were in 
many respects similar to typical for-profit corporations. Until 
they were taken over by the government, they had sharehold-
ers who were seeking profits, and CEOs compensated for “per-
formance.”  
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are excellent examples of 
what can go wrong when government is too involved with busi-
ness. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securitized mortgages and 
sold securities consisting of interests in those mortgages.172 
They also held their own portfolios of mortgages. In both these 
activities, they effectively were subsidized by the govern-
 
 170. See About Fannie Mae, FANNIE MAE, http://www.fanniemae.com/ 
aboutfm/charter.jhtml?p=About+Fannie+Mae&searchid=1288392247853 (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2011) (“The 1968 Charter Act . . . transformed [Fannie Mae] 
into a ‘government-sponsored private corporation.’”). 
 171. See Timeline: A History of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, FIN. TIMES, 
July 15, 2008, http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto07152008122 
5260084 (“[In] 1970 Freddie Mac [was] created to provide competition in the 
secondary mortgage market and end Fannie Mae’s monopoly.”). 
 172. See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL SUBSIDIES AND THE 
HOUSING GSES (2001) [hereinafter CBO, SUBSIDIES REPORT], available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/28xx/doc2841/GSEs.pdf. 
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ment.173 Investors believed that securities issued by Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac were implicitly guaranteed by the gov-
ernment. Similarly, investors believed that the debt issued by 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to buy their portfolios of mort-
gages implicitly was guaranteed by the government. Investors 
paid for these implicit government guarantees, providing the 
GSEs with financing on more favorable terms.174 Other gov-
ernment subsidies included exemptions from state and local 
taxes. While some of the benefits were passed along to borrow-
ers, the GSEs profited enormously. Their CEOs were compen-
sated handsomely, at levels similar to those of CEOs of nongo-
vernment companies.175 Private companies’ results were 
adversely affected by this “unfair” competition.176 In the early- 
to mid-2000s, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were found to 
have grievously misstated their accounting results; the ac-
counting results had to be restated, and their CEOs were 
ousted.177 
 
 173. See id. (noting the implicit guarantee and other tax and regulatory 
exemptions due to their GSE status). 
 174. See Dwight Jaffee, The Role of the GSEs and Housing Policy in the Fi-
nancial Crisis 6–7 (Feb. 25, 2010) (paper presented to the Financial Crisis In-
quiry Commission) (on file with the authors).  
 175. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Congress Floats Fannie, Freddie Salary 
Caps, ABC NEWS, July 22, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id= 
5423870&page=1 (“Freddie Mac paid Chairman and Chief Executive Richard 
Syron nearly $19.8 million in compensation even though the mortgage compa-
ny’s stock lost half its value. During the same period, Fannie Mae President 
and Chief Executive Daniel Mudd got compensation valued by the company at 
$12.2 million, including a $2.2 million bonus.”). 
 176. See CBO, SUBSIDIES REPORT, supra note 172, at 3. 
 177. See Eric Dash, Fannie Mae to Restate Results by $6.3 Billion Because 
of Accounting, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, at C1, available at 2006 WLNR 
21115548; Jonathan D. Glater, Freddie Mac Understated Its Earnings by $5 
Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2003, at C1, available at 2003 WLNR 5659894; 
see also Freddie Mac’s Dean, Chowdhury Latest to Leave Amid Restatement, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 28, 2003, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
newsarchive&sid=aqzi4p5OqNw0&refer=us (“The departure of the four em-
ployees followed the ouster of newly installed CEO Parseghian after the Baker 
Botts report showed he had knowledge of derivatives trades used by Freddie 
Mac in 2000, 2001 and 2002 to lower earnings in an effort to reduce volatility. 
. . . Parseghian took over from Leland Brendsel, who was ousted in June along 
with President David Glenn and Chief Financial Officer Vaughn Clarke after 
the extent of the accounting errors became known to company investigators. 
Company officials wanted to defer profits resulting from a change in account-
ing rules in 2001. . . . Gains in the derivatives as interest rates fell would have 
boosted profit in current quarters and made it harder for the company to 
maintain the pace of earnings growth.”).  
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The purchases and securitization of mortgages had a public 
mission: to increase the availability of mortgage funding, in-
cluding in distressed markets and to low-income borrowers, 
and to equalize mortgage rates throughout the country.178 
Holding mortgages in the portfolios of the GSEs had far less of 
a role in such a mission. Rather, it mostly served to increase 
yield, which inured to the benefit of the GSEs’ executives and 
shareholders, and to increase risk, which ultimately cost the 
taxpayers a considerable amount of money.179  
Three hundred fifty-four lawmakers, including both Demo-
crats and Republicans, received campaign contributions from 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.180 Here are the top six recipients 
in the period between 1989 and 2008, according to the blog 
OpenSecrets:181 
 
Name Office State Party 
Grand 
Total 
Total from 
PACs 
Total from 
Individuals 
Dodd, 
 Christopher J. 
S CT D $165,400 $48,500 $116,900 
Obama,  
Barack 
S IL D $126,349 $6,000 $120,349 
Kerry, 
John 
S MA D $111,000 $2,000 $109,000 
 
 178. See CBO, SUBSIDIES REPORT, supra note 172, at 3–4; Dwight M. Jaf-
fee, The Future Role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the U.S. Mortgage 
Market 11 (Dec. 18, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty 
.haas.berkeley.edu/jaffee/Papers/JaffeeGSEAtlanta.pdf. 
 179. See CBO, SUBSIDIES REPORT, supra note 172, at 3–4; see also Jaffee, 
supra note 174, at 15 (“Risk-taking—whether interest rate risk or credit risk—
can maximize the expected benefits for the GSEs’ management and share-
holders because they profit greatly when there are favorable outcomes, where-
as the bondholders (if the GSEs were to become bankrupt), or the taxpayers (if 
they bailout the bondholders) suffer the major losses when there are unfavor-
able outcomes. Furthermore, the normal deterrence to risk-taking created by 
bondholder discipline was largely absent for the GSEs because their bondhold-
ers assumed—correctly—that they were protected by an implicit government 
guarantee. Finally, the GSE penetration of its primary market for conforming 
mortgages had effectively reached 100 percent, so only by expanding to riskier 
ventures could the firms had [sic] hoped to continue to report growing earn-
ings. The bottom line is that GSE managers long understood that they and 
their shareholders would benefit from risk-taking as long as the higher risks 
created higher expected returns.”). 
 180. See Lindsay Renick Mayer, Update: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac In-
vest in Lawmakers, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Sept. 11, 2008), http://www.opensecrets 
.org/news/2008/09/update-fannie-mae-and-freddie.html.  
 181. Id. 
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Bennett, 
Robert F. 
S UT R $107,999 $71,499 $36,500 
Bachus, 
Spencer 
H AL R $103,300 $70,500 $32,800 
Blunt, 
Roy 
H MO R $96,950 $78,500 $18,450 
 
The total of all the 354 lawmakers’ contributions is 
$4,844,572.182 
On September 7, 2008, the government placed Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac into conservatorship.183 Recent estimates are 
that the bailout may cost $154 billion or even more.184 Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac seem to have done fairly well under gov-
ernment conservatorship,185 but it is difficult to determine how 
much of this success is attributable to the U.S. Treasury’s pur-
chases of Fannie and Freddie’s securities, and securities in 
their portfolios.186 Interestingly, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
have been given big contracts to manage the TARP program, 
something the overseers of TARP have strongly criticized.187 
One commentator described the situation as follows:  
 
 182. See id. 
 183. See Jaffee, supra note 174, at 5. 
 184. See Zachary A. Goldfarb, Mortgage Bailout’s Ballooning Price, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 22, 2010, at A20, available at 2010 WLNR 25808186; see also Isi-
dore, supra note 7. A Congressional Budget Office report notes, “The opera-
tions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac added $291 billion to CBO’s August 2009 
baseline estimate of the federal deficit for fiscal year 2009 and $99 billion to the 
total deficit projected for the 2010–2019 period.” CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO’S 
BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 2 (2010), availa-
ble at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10878/01-13-FannieFreddie.pdf. 
 185. See generally FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, CONSERVATOR’S REPORT ON 
THE ENTERPRISES’ FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: SECOND QUARTER 2010 (2010), 
available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/16592/ConservatorsRpt82610.pdf (dis-
cussing the financial condition of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac during their 
conservatorships); see also Appelbaum, supra note 7, at B7. 
 186. See Jaffee, supra note 178, at 5–6.  
 187. See Report Knocks TARP Ties to Fannie and Freddie, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK BLOG (Oct. 14, 2010, 2:32 AM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2010/10/14/report-snipes-at-tarp-ties-to-fannie-and-freddie (“The Treasury 
Department has relied heavily on private companies and the troubled mort-
gage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to manage the $700 billion Wall 
Street bailout, a report released on Thursday said. The report by the Congres-
sional panel overseeing the Troubled Asset Relief Program, said that the $437 
million in Treasury contracts to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and private compa-
nies to manage critical aspects of the bailout program raised a number of con-
cerns about public oversight and conflicts of interest . . . . ‘Treasury may be 
less likely to expedite meaningful reforms of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
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Fannie and Freddie are not likely to disappear anytime soon. The 
combined mortgage giants, now 80% owned by the government, con-
tinue to provide approximately 75% of funding to the mortgage mar-
ket. In addition, Fannie and Freddie insure or own $5.7 trillion of the 
outstanding total of $11 trillion in mortgages. The government has 
agreed to provide unlimited funding while policy makers debate how 
to reform the mortgage system to prevent Fannie and Freddie from 
again becoming a systemic risk to the financial system.188 
A consensus is emerging that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
should disappear or at least assume a far more limited role, but 
accomplishing this goal will be difficult.189 
The picture that emerges is decidedly mixed. Clearly, pre-
conservatorship, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had become 
poster children for the perils of government involvement in 
business. Their original mission was a laudable one. But some-
thing went awry. One commentator notes:  
In my view, the GSEs’ high-risk mortgage investments reflect truly 
unacceptable decisions by the managers of large financial firms with 
a public mission to stabilize mortgage markets, with government in 
their status, and with almost unlimited access to low-cost funding 
based on an implicit guarantee of government support. While we 
might hope to receive much more responsible behavior from such 
managers, I fear this is the inevitable result of combining a public 
mission with private profit incentives.190 
At this juncture, at least in the short term, Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac are probably necessary evils as is the promi-
nent role government has in running them. Many difficult 
questions arise: Should their role in TARP be limited? How 
should their executives be compensated, and for what? When 
should the conservatorship end? Should the government cap 
the amount it is willing to spend in bailing them out? All of 
these decisions hold enormous potential for conflict, including 
those between government’s interests and those of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, between individuals’ interests, and those of 
their employers. Even assuming we eventually limit or even 
 
when it has employed them for combined arrangements of $240.5 million and 
when these firms agreed to provide their services at cost, receiving no profit 
from the deals,’ the report said.”). 
 188. Michael Zielinkski, FHFA Conservator’s Report—Why Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac Failed, PROBLEM BANK LIST (Aug. 30, 2010), http:// 
problembanklist.com/fhfa-conservators-report-why-fannie-mae-and-freddie-mac 
-failed-0183/. 
 189. Murrey Jacobson, Obama Administration Unveils Fannie, Freddie 
Proposals to Much Debate, PBS NEWSHOUR, Feb. 11, 2011, available at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2011/02/administration-rolls-out-proposals 
-for-fannie-freddie-to-much-debate.html. 
 190. Jaffee, supra note 174, at 15. 
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eliminate the roles Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac play, we will 
be faced with these problems for some time to come. 
V.  ADDRESSING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN BUSINESS 
AND GOVERNMENT   
Many commentators argue that government ought not to 
become involved in business, if at all possible. We agree that 
many types of government involvement in business are unde-
sirable, particularly where the result is to socialize losses while 
privatizing gains. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac come imme-
diately to mind. But it is probably unrealistic to hope govern-
ment will be able to stay uninvolved in business; we therefore 
seek to identify the least problematic ways government could 
be involved in business. Government involvement in business 
can certainly claim some successes. After experimenting twice 
with establishing a for-profit Bank of the United States with 
private shareholders, Congress finally, in 1913, set up the Fed-
eral Reserve (Fed), which functions as a national bank but 
without the private shareholders and the many conflicts of in-
terest that plagued its predecessors. The Fed controls enor-
mous amounts of money. Sometimes both its judgment and its 
motives are questioned, but its reputation for integrity sur-
passes that of its predecessors. Government was finally able to 
set up a national bank that works—usually.  
The examples in Part IV show how government-run busi-
nesses involve conflicts of interest on multiple levels, some of 
them the hard conflicts that law cannot easily address. Indeed, 
almost by definition, these conflicts of interest cannot be ad-
dressed by rules: any given action (or inaction) may reflect a 
conflict. That is precisely what makes hard cases hard. What 
about using a more standards-based approach? Doing so may 
help, but standards require fact-intensive ex-post determina-
tions; such determinations will be expensive and unpredictable. 
Law simply cannot scrutinize everything. Thus, alternative ap-
proaches are needed. Some of these approaches would apply 
more directly to business actors, and some more to government 
actors. Some approaches would apply to both.  
An approach fitting to government and business actors in-
volves promoting personal and professional responsibility. This 
could be done through enhanced ethics education and through 
the promotion of norms of responsibility. Here, government eth-
ics law offers a useful insight: it focuses on the ethics of the in-
dividuals who run institutions rather than on the institutions. 
  
1688 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1637 
 
The Standards of Conduct for Federal Employees set forth 
broad principles and detailed federal regulations directed at in-
dividual actors and seek to implement these principles. It may 
also be desirable to have Standards of Conduct for Public Com-
pany Employees, or perhaps different standards of conduct for 
employees of public companies in different industry sectors. 
Merely regulating the companies themselves is not enough. 
There should be more of a focus on influencing the behavior of 
individual managers.  
Another recipe for enhanced personal responsibility is ac-
countability, which in the private sector in part means liability. 
Changes in law or in business practice should perhaps impose 
on the most senior (or the best compensated) business manag-
ers some measure of personal liability when their businesses 
act in ways that harm others. For example, the most senior or 
best compensated investment bankers should perhaps be per-
sonally liable if their bank takes on too much risk and thereby 
harms its creditors.191 Indeed, investment banks were run more 
responsibly when they were general partnerships with personal 
liability for partners, suggesting that the change in this indus-
try to the corporate form and unlimited liability in the 1970s 
and 1980s had significant negative effects.192 Enhanced per-
sonal liability for irresponsible business decisions could influ-
ence action directly in specific instances and also might pro-
mote norms of personal and professional responsibility among 
business managers. In some situations, enhanced personal lia-
bility of business managers might even make detailed regula-
tion of businesses less necessary. 
In government, officials often are not held personally ac-
countable even for the most blatant conflicts of interest. Con-
flict-of-interest laws are mostly contained in criminal statutes 
that are narrowly defined and fail to cover most conflicts.193 
Prosecution is rare. Civil liability of government officials is al-
most unheard of, and when liability is imposed for wrongful 
conduct the government usually pays rather than the wrong-
doer. There is no government equivalent to a shareholder de-
 
 191. See Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Berle’s Vision Beyond Shareholder 
Interests: Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173, 1186–89 (2010).  
 192. See id. at 1179. 
 193. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 207 (2006) (prohibiting former government em-
ployees from representing back to the government in certain circumstances); 
id. § 208 (prohibiting certain financial conflicts of interest and conflicts of in-
terest arising out of certain negotiations for private employment). 
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rivative suit that can be brought on behalf of the public. Voters 
are principally responsible for penalizing excessive conflicts of 
interest in government, with the political checks and balances 
of a two-party system playing a critical supporting role. There 
are many inefficiencies of government divided between two or 
more political parties, including gridlock, but from the vantage 
point of policing conflicts of interest, divided government may 
be the best alternative. Government ethics in this context will 
be highly politicized, but at least it will not be ignored.  
Another helpful approach is the use of professional contrar-
ians in both business and government. Regulatory contrarians 
would be offices within regulatory agencies whose charge is to 
consider ways in which all relevant viewpoints are not being 
considered.194 Regulatory contrarians also can be on guard for 
instances in which self-interest and cronyism might be coloring 
regulators’ decisions and actions. There is perhaps a role not 
just for regulatory contrarians but also contrarians in business. 
Shareholder activists might push for private contrarians—some 
version of shadow boards of directors or other similar bodies 
within corporations—as a best practice that would improve a 
corporation’s governance by providing a check on difficult-to-
detect conflicts of interest.195 By contrast with courts, which de-
fer to company management unless they have a strong reason 
not to, a contrarian might be able to look more critically at 
management, perhaps focusing particularly on ways in which 
self-interest and cronyism might have prompted the board to 
defer to management rather than fully exercising their role as 
monitors. 
Another helpful approach is to disperse decisionmaking 
among different agencies. The bailouts, for example, were more 
credible when, in addition to the cadre of Goldman Sachs 
alumni at the Treasury, the Fed was involved. Congressional 
oversight is another answer, although this form of contrarian 
thinking is inherently politicized and labors under its own con-
flicts of interest. On the business side, increasing shareholder 
participation in key decisions such as executive compensation 
might mitigate the impact of conflicts of interest that affect di-
 
 194. See Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 88 
N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1711901.  
 195. For a discussion of one type of contrarian that could be used in corpo-
rate governance, see Kelli A. Alces, The Equity Trustee, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 717, 
717 (2010) (recommending that an “‘equity trustee’” be appointed by an equity 
committee “to represent equity interests as a whole, . . . [to] monitor[ ] man-
agement . . . and remain[ ] informed about corporate affairs”). 
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rectors’ decisionmaking, although expanded shareholder de-
mocracy also has costs that have to be considered along with its 
benefits. 
Yet another consideration is that certain views are getting 
too much exposure to key decisionmakers. In government, it is 
the views of political operatives and campaign contributors that 
probably get too much exposure. When a powerful office in the 
White House—the Office of Political Affairs—spends much of 
its time catering to the needs of political campaigns and en-
couraging the rest of the executive branch to do the same, it 
should not be surprising that the persons who organize and pay 
for these campaigns get what they want from government.196 
Stricter regulation of political activity by executive branch offi-
cials—particularly their involvement in political fundraisers—
would help reduce the imbalance in influence between persons 
who support political campaigns and those who do not.  
Another part of the answer—especially for hard cases, con-
flicts of interest that are difficult to regulate through prohibi-
tions on conduct—is transparency. Federal securities law seeks 
to bring more transparency to public companies.197 The Sar-
banes-Oxley Act in 2002198 and the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010199 
brought a shift toward yet more regulation of transparency in 
large business organizations. As President Obama recently 
pointed out in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Citizen’s 
United decision, corporate involvement in political campaigns 
is an area where there is very little transparency.200 The presi-
 
 196. See Painter, supra note 124, at A23 (discussing the role of OPA in en-
hancing the influence of campaign contributors).  
 197. After the market crash of 1929, Congress federalized transparency re-
quirements in the Securities Act of 1933, which requires disclosure of material 
information about securities sold to the public, and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, which requires, among other things, disclosure by public compa-
nies in periodic reports, disclosure from persons soliciting shareholder votes, 
and candor by brokers in dealings with customers. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77–78 
(2006). This transparency mandate informs investors about persons to whom 
they have entrusted money and what those persons are doing with it. State 
corporate law, by contrast, seeks accountability by controlling the conduct of 
persons who manage corporations. Both securities and corporate law recognize 
that it would be naive to rely on shareholder democracy and the market alone 
to control behavior of disloyal or dishonest managers. 
 198. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 199. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, §§ 311–319, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 200. See President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 
2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks 
-president-state-union-address. 
  
2011] COMPROMISED FIDUCIARIES 1691 
 
dent proposed legislation that would increase transparency in 
this area, but so far Congress has not acted. The members of 
Congress who have not acted are in many instances recipients 
of this corporate largess—one of the most glaring and apparent-
ly intractable conflicts of interest. 
  CONCLUSION   
Government involvement in business—often as a regulator 
and sometimes as a manager—is here to stay. Conflicts of in-
terest undermine fiduciary obligations in both government and 
business, and many of these conflicts are difficult to regulate. 
Understanding when these hard-to-regulate conflicts of interest 
arise and how they affect decisionmaking in business and gov-
ernment is a critical first step. Promoting an ethos of personal 
and professional responsibility of business and government de-
cisionmakers, with an emphasis on independent judgment, is 
also important, although without concrete steps this goal may 
be easier to aspire to than to achieve. Imposing some degree of 
personal liability in the business sphere and commensurate 
measures of accountability in government may be an important 
step toward greater responsibility. Strengthening alternative 
voices in the decisionmaking process is also important, whether 
it be shareholders, ordinary voters, or professional contrarians 
who represent alternative viewpoints within an organization. 
Reducing decisionmakers’ exposure to the most potent sources 
of conflicting interest—for example, funders of political cam-
paigns—is also important. Finally, increasing transparency in 
both business and government should help. Louis Brandeis was 
correct when he observed that “[s]unlight is . . . the best of dis-
infectants.”201 
 
 201. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS 
USE IT 92 (1914).  
